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The population of Niamey, the capital city of the West African Republic of Niger, is 
exploding.1  Since urban residents need houses, large tracts of peri-urban2  land around the city 
are being transformed from fields to suburbs.3  This land transformation is being accompanied 
by a legal transformation from customary to formal state law.4  As is true of most legal 
transformations, this one is producing winners and losers.5  The winners are those with access to 
financial, political, and social capital who use their superior strength to take advantage of the 
new rules.6  The losers are the peasant farmers and their families who are uprooted from their 
traditions and their main sources of livelihood.7 
Under customary law in rural Niger, land is inextricably interwoven with history, identity, 
and religion.8 One’s access to land depends on membership and good standing in a family, a 
 
1 Hamadou Issaka, La Promotion Immoblière Informelle a Niamey: L’Irregularite Comme Reponse a la Crise du 
Logement, URBANITES (Nov. 8, 2013), available at http://www.revue-urbanites.fr/la-promotion-immobiliere-
informelle-a- niamey-lirregularite-comme-reponse-a-la-crise-du-logement/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (arguing 
Niamey has undergone vertiginous growth); see The World Factbook (Niger) (People and Society), U.S. CENT. 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (estimating Niger's rate of urbanization as 4.27% for 2015-2020, ranking 11th for 
highest urbanization rate in the world). 
2 There is no universally accepted definition of the term peri-urban. Beacon Mbiba & Marie Huchzeremey, 
Contentious Development: Peri-Urban Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, PROGRESS IN DEV. STUD. 113, 114 (2002). 
However, it generally refers to land around the periphery of urban areas that includes elements of both rural and 
urban use and where farmland is being converted to suburbs. See Achamyeleh Gashu Adam, Land Tenure in the 
Changing Peri-Urban Areas of Ethiopia: The Case of Bahir Dar City, INT’L J. OF URB. & REGIONAL RES. 1970, 
1970- 1971 (2014) (arguing peri-urban lands are places just outside municipal boundaries where urban and rural 
coexist and where farmland is being converted to suburban house plots); Janine Ubink, Traditional Authority 
Revisited: Popular Perceptions of Chiefs and Chieftaincy in Peri-Urban Ghana, J. LEGAL PLURALISM & 
UNOFFICIAL L.   123, 129 (2007) (defining peri-urban as “approximating a continuum from rural to urban”); See 
also IGNASIO MALIZANI JIMU, EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND RELATIONS IN PERI-URBAN BLANTYRE, MALAWAI 69 
(2012) (arguing peri-urban land is usually characterized by “the encroachment of the expanding urban area onto the 
surrounding rural land . . . affecting the livelihood of small farmers” and where land goes from rural to urban and 
from customary to statutory tenure). 
3 See infra Part IV.D 
4 See JIMU, supra note 2, at 69. 
5 See infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text (arguing elites in developing countries always benefit from changes in 
the law). 
6 See infra Part V.A. 
7 See infra Part V.B. 
8 See Thomas Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets into Pigeon Holes: The Effects of Globalization and State Legal Reform in 
Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL.635, 680-691 (2002) (arguing land in Nigerien villages 
is closely connected to spiritual beliefs, history, and community identity); see see also PARKER SHIPTON, MORTGAGING 
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lineage group, and a village.9   At the same time, land helps define those institutions.10  Villagers 
explain themselves, their family histories, and the linkages between families by recounting 
stories of ancestors who founded their villages, usually by clearing the land for agricultural 
use.11  All males who descend from the original, land-clearing ancestors can claim membership 
in the lineage and thus present-day access to land.12 
Rural land in Niger is also intertwined with spiritual beliefs. Land helps bind together the 
temporal and spiritual worlds.13  Villages are surrounded by all manner of spirits including the 
black spirits (gangi bi) who controlled the land before humans arrived, and the spirits of 
ancestors who made pacts with the gangi bi that permitted them to inhabit and exploit the land.14  
Those spirits intervene in the daily lives of rural people, sometimes helping them, sometimes 
harming them.15 
Rural Nigerien people who lose their land as a result of urbanization lose their 
connections to these powerful practical and symbolic touchstones that bring order and meaning 
to their lives, but that is not all they lose.  Because most rural Nigeriens rely on subsistence 
farming, many will also lose their livelihoods.16  In Niger, there is no equivalent of Detroit or 
 
THE ANCESTORS: IDEOLOGIES OF ATTACHMENT IN AFRICA 117 (2009) (arguing land is tightly tied up with social 
position and also with “the most intimate, emotionally charged dimensions of personhood and pride”). 
9 Thomas Kelley, Unintended Consequences of Legal Westernization in Niger: Harming Contemporary Slaves by 
Reconceptualizing Property, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 999, 1006-07; Parker Shipton & Mitzi Goheen, Understanding 
African Land-Holding: Power, Wealth, and Meaning, 62 AFR. J. OF THE INT’L AFR. INST. 307, 307 (1992) (arguing 
land in Africa helps “define personal and social identities”); see SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 110 (arguing in East 
Africa, people belong to their land). 
10 See Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 663 (describing a Nigerien village that traces its history to a group of 
brothers who dug a well and cleared the bush around it). 
11 Id. 
12 Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1006-08. 
13 See id. at 1007 (arguing Nigerien traditional leaders ensure land is used in ways approved by the spirits). 
14 See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
15 Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 647-48; Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 107.  
16 The World Factbook (Niger) (People and Society), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY , available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); see U.N. Exec. 
Bd. of the U. N. Dev. Programme, the U. N. Population Fund and the U. N. Off. for Project Servs., Country 
Programme Document for Niger (2019-2021), ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. GEN/N18/393/74/N1839374 (Nov. 21, 2018) (arguing 
that a large part of the Nigereian population is dependent on subsistence farming). 
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Pittsburg where displaced agricultural workers can find wage labor,17 so many will simply 
starve.18 
This paper explores Niger’s peri-urban transition in land use and law.  Part II provides 
background on Niger with an emphasis on the demographics that explain why the country is 
facing a potentially cataclysmic if slow-moving land crisis.  Part III will indulge in a step often 
skipped by legal scholars and development practitioners: it will explore in some detail the 
customary law that governs land use in rural areas.  Without understanding customary law, one 
cannot understand the enormity of the loss that will result when fields become suburbs.  Part IV 
will shift the lens to the city and describe the legal and political context that has permitted 
Niamey’s explosive and largely unregulated growth.  It notes that when formal state law and 
customary law bump into one another in peri-urban areas, formal law almost always prevails: the 
land is irrevocably transformed from a key element of a social, historical, and spiritual complex, 
into a commodity.  Part V describes in detail who wins and who loses as a result of the 
transformation.  The paper concludes that the wealthy and well-connected win, while peasant 
farmers lose.  They lose their livelihoods and, just as important, the customary law that has 
sustained their communities through centuries of adversity. 
II. About Niger 
Niger is among the poorest, least developed countries in the world.19  One reason is its 
 
17 See Interview with Hamdallaye Canton Chief, in Hamdallaye, Republic of Niger (May 1, 2018) (arguing “[i]f 
peasant farmers sell their land, what will they do? It’s not as if there are factories in the city where they can go find 
jobs”); see also SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 33 (arguing that in the U.S. urban employment cushioned the blow from 
rural land dispossession but that in Africa no such safety net exists). 
18 See infra Part V.B.2.a (describing the livelihood effects of rural Nigeriens losing access to agricultural land). 
19 Human Development Reports: Human Development Data (1990-2017), U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (ranking Niger as the poorest country in the world out of all 189 
countries listed); The World Factbook (Niger) (Introduction), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY , available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) ("Niger is one of 
the poorest countries in the world with minimal government services and insufficient funds to develop its resource 
base, and is ranked last in the world on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index.").  
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paucity of natural resources.20 It is landlocked and two-thirds of its surface is located in the 
parched Sahara Desert,21 a zone unsuitable for agricultural production.22  The southern third of 
the country, where most of the population lives,23 is only marginally more fecund.24   The soils 
there tend to be sandy and of poor quality,25watercourses are rare, and rainfall, upon which most 
farmers depend,26 is sparse and variable.27  These challenging geographic and climatic realities 
are troubling in a country where most peoples’ livelihood depends on agriculture.28 
 
 
20 Although Niger’s land is unproductive, it is not completely bereft of natural resources. The World Factbook (Niger) 
(Geography), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ng.html  (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (listing Niger's natural resources as uranium, coal, iron ore, tin, 
phosphates, gold, molybdenum, gypsum, salt, and petroleum). It has significant uranium deposits in its northern 
mountains, the proceeds of which led to a minor economic boom in the 1970s. Ursula Meyer, Negocier l’acces, la 
propriete et l’autorité publique en marge de la ville. Enjeux foncier a Niamey et production d’Etat au Niger 108 (2016) 
(doctoral thesis presented to the Faculty of Geosciences and the Environment, Universitiy of Lausanne) (on file with 
author). But uranium prices dropped in the 1980s as nuclear power fell out of favor in the developed world, and the 
mines have done little to lift Niger out of poverty. Gabriella Korling, In Search of the State, An Ethnography of Public 
Service Provision in Urban Niger 58 (2011) (doctoral dissertation in Cultural Anthropology, Uppsala Universitet in 
Sweden) (arguing uranium prices fell in the late 1970s). More recently, petroleum deposits have been identified in 
northeastern Niger. The World Factbook (Niger), supra note 1; Meyer, supra note 20, at 120 (referring to a recent 
increase in mining and oil extraction). 
21 U.N. Int'l Human Rights Instruments, Common Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties: the 
Niger, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. GEN/G18/075/27/G1807527 (May 22, 2018) ("Located in the eastern part of western Africa, the 
Niger is a landlocked country with a surface area of 1,267,000 km2. Two thirds of the national territory is in the 
Saharan zone."); The World Factbook (Niger) (Geography), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) ("[L]andlocked; 
one of the hottest countries in the world; northern four-fifths is desert, southern one-fifth is savanna, suitable for 
livestock and limited agriculture[.]"); Meyer, supra note 20, at 91. 
22 Common Core, supra note 21, ¶ 1. 
23 The World Factbook (Niger) (Geography), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) ("[M]ajority of 
the populace is located in the southernmost extreme of the country along the border with Nigeria and Benin[.]"); 
Meyer, supra note 20, at 91 (arguing 80% of Niger’s population lives in the southern third of the country). 
24 The World Factbook (Niger) (Geography), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (reporting that 
only 12.3% of Niger's land is "arable"). 
25 Irahimn Yahaya Ibrahim, Niger in the Face of the Sahelo-Saharan Islamic Insurgency: Precarious Stability in a 
Troubled Neighborhood5 (Sahel Research Group, Working Paper No. 004, 2014). 
26 The World Factbook (Niger) (Geography), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (reporting that 
Niger has only 300km of waterways, ranking 93 out of 107 countries listed); Florence Bron-Saidatou, La Gouvernance 
Fonciere au Niger: Malgre des Acquis, de Nombreuses Difficultes 6 (2015) (working paper produced by a coalition of 
French Development Agencies). 
27 Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 6; see Ambe J. Njoh, The Role and Goals of the State in Urban Development in 
Niger, 30 HABITAT INT’L 540, 545 (2006) (referring to Niger’s “low rainfall”). 
28 The World Factbook: Africa (Niger), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019)  (arguing that 
agriculture provides a livelihood for more than 80% of Niger's population). 
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Approximately 85% of Niger’s population engages in agricultural work and most people 
depend, at least in part, on subsistence farming for their food.29  Irrigation is rare, so rainfed 
agriculture is vital to peoples’ survival; however, climate change is resulting in a shrinking of 
Niger’s rainy season, cutting further into agricultural productivity.30  Due to decreasing yields, 
most households supplement their livelihood by engaging in animal husbandry,31 wage labor, and 
informal small business activity.32  
Niger’s deteriorating agricultural conditions are particularly alarming when one considers 
how many mouths there are to feed. The country’s population growth rate is the highest in the 
world at 3.9%.33 In the early 1960s, around the time of Niger’s independence from France, Niger 
had approximately 4.3 million inhabitants.34  By 2012, the population had expanded to 17 
million.35  Estimates put the current population at over 20 million36 and, if the growth trends 
continue, 33 million by 2030.37 
The converging trends of land degradation and population growth means that many 
more people, almost all of whom need arable land to feed themselves, must crowd onto ever-
 
29
 The World Factbook (Niger) (People and Society), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); see 
Country Programme, supra note 16 (arguing that a large part of the Nigereian population is dependent on 
subsistence farming). 
30  The World Factbook: Africa (Niger), supra note 29 (arguing that rainfall in Niger is declining); Bron-Saidatou, 
supra note 26, at 8. 
31 Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 6 (arguing 43.2% of Niger’s population engages in animal husbandry). 
32  See The World Bank, Republic of Niger Priorities for Ending Poverty and Boosting Shared Prosperity Systematic 
Country Diagnostic, 12, Report No. 115661-NE (Nov. 28, 2017). 
33  The World Factbook: Africa (Niger), supra, note 29 ("Niger has the highest total fertility rate (TFR) of any 
country in the world, averaging close to 7 children per woman in 2016."); Exec. Bd. of the U. N. Dev. Programme, 
the U. N. Population Fund and the U. N. Off. for Project Servs., U.N. Population Fund Country Programme 
Document for Niger, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. DP/FPA/CPD/NER/9 (Nov. 27, 2018) ("Niger’s annual demographic growth rate 
is the highest in the world, at 3.9 per cent; its population, currently 17,138,707, will double every 18 years."); The 
World Bank, supra note 32, at ¶ 52 (arguing at present, an average Nigerien woman experiences 7.3 live births 
during her lifetime). 
34 Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 4. 
35 Id. 
36 Niger, THE WORLD BANK, available at https://data.worldbank.org/country/niger?view=chart (last visited Sept. 27, 
2019) (reporting Niger's population as 21,602,472 in 2017); Country Programme, supra note 16, ¶ 1 (estimating 
Niger's population at 21,466,862 as of 2017).  
37  See The World Bank, supra note 36. 
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smaller fields upon which less and less rain is falling.38 The overcrowding, in turn, exacerbates 
problems with soil fertility. As the expanding population seeks to feed itself by planting ever-
more staple crops, the amount of fallow land decreases, further diminishing the fields’ 
productive capacity.39 The end result is that contemporary Niger experiences periodic acute 
food crises and 16.7% of children under the age of 5 are chronically malnourished.40 
Rapid, poorly planned and poorly regulated urbanization is exacerbating the crisis in 
rural land and livelihoods.41 Although Niger is still a predominantly rural society, its rate of 
urbanization is among the highest in the world.42  The challenging demographic and climatic 
conditions described in preceding paragraphs are driving the rural population –particularly 
young men43 – towards the city.44  Further, the lure of the city has been enhanced by the rise of 
economic liberalization and structural adjustment policies, which have  compelled the Nigerien 
state to withdraw much of its healthcare, education, and infrastructure investment from rural 
areas.45 Combined, these factors have led to sizzling growth in Niamey’s population.46 
 
38 The World Factbook: Africa (Niger), supra note 29; see also Interview with Niamey, Former Resident of Goudel, 
in Republic of Niger (Apr. 30, 2018) (arguing the shrinking rainy season will no longer support the best strains of 
millet, Niger’s staple crop).  
39
 Country Programme, supra note 16, ¶ 5 ("Niger’s challenges also result from population pressure, the adverse 
effects of climate change, inadequate agricultural practices and resulting land degradation."); Bron-Saidatou, supra 
note 26, at 8 (arguing population pressure is leading to shorter fallow periods and the overall degradation of soils); 
Interview with Niamey, Judge, Republic of Niger (May 9, 2018) (arguing that due to population pressure it is no longer 
possible to let land lie fallow so that it is overcultivated); see generally Hamdallaye, supra note 17 (arguing there is 
“enormous pressure on land” in Niger). 
40  The World Bank, supra note 32, ¶ 152 ("[B]eing malnourished is almost normal (44 percent of children [are] 
stunted)[.]"); see Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 5 (arguing acute malnutrition touches 16.7% of Inger’s children under 
5). 
41 Meyer, supra note 20, at 90 (arguing rural land loss is causing Nigeriens to seek refuge in cities); see infra notes 
259-260 and accompanying text (arguing urban expansion in Niger is guided by private interests and poorly regulated). 
42 See The World Factbook (Niger) (People and Society), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (estimating 
Niger's rate of urbanization as 4.27% for 2015-2020, which ranks 11th for highest urbanization rate in the world). 
43 See THE WORLD BANK, REPUBLIC OF NIGER: PRIORITIES FOR ENDING POVERTY AND BOOSTING SHARED 
PROSPERITY: SYSTEMATIC COUNTRY DIAGNOSTIC ¶ 40 (Report No. 115661-NE) (2017). 
44 Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing thousands of rural citizens seek a better life in Niamey every year and most have no 
qualifications); Meyer, supra note 20, at 103, 105 (arguing Niger sees spikes in urban population growth at times of 
famine). 
45 Meyer, note 20, at 110; see Körling, supra note 20, at 21 (arguing Niamey is privileged over rural areas in both 
health and education). 
46 Issaka, supra note 1. 
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Specifically, in 1977, the capital counted 243,000 residents; by 2000, the number was 650,000; 
today, estimates run as high as 1.5 million.47  Because all of these new arrivals need shelter, and 
because most residential construction in Niger is in the form of one-story,48 metal-roofed, mud 
and cement houses surrounded by small walled compounds,49 the city is gobbling up large 
swaths of agricultural land each year and irreversibly converting it into suburban house plots.50 
In sum, Niger is in the midst of a vicious cycle. Due largely to demographic and climatic 
pressures on agricultural land, ever more people are seeking sustenance in the city. As the city 
grows, it devours the agricultural land that is the main source of food – even if an increasingly 
feeble one – for Nigeriens who remain in rural communities. As the following sections will 
demonstrate, when real estate developers and investors convert fields to suburbs, rural people 
lose not only their source of food but their way of life: a social and spiritual identity that is 
rooted in, and to large extent defined by, land. 
III. Existing Customary Land Law in Rural Niger51 
Customary land law has been remarkably resilient in Niger.52  In spite of numerous attempts 
by Niger’s government during the 20th and 21st centuries to weaken or eliminate it,53 most of 
 
47 Körling supra note 20, at 77; Common Core, supra note 21, Table 1 (reporting Niamey's population as 397,437 in 
1988, 725,030 in 2001, and 1,011,277 in 2012); see The World Factbook: Africa (Niger), supra note 29 (estimating 
Niamey's population at 1.214 million in 2018). 
48 See Henri Kokou Motcho, Urbanisation et Role de la Chefferie Traditionnelle dans la Communaute Urbaine de 
Niamey, 229 LES CAHIERS D’OUTRE-MER, REVUE DE GEOGRAPHIE DE BORDEAUX 73, 74 (2005) (arguing that 
Niamey’s expansion has included few multi-story buildings). 
49 See id. at 2 (arguing housing density is low in Niamey because most structures are single-story). 
50 See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text. 
51 Custom in Africa is a contested and controversial construct. Scholars generally reject the idea that custom was a 
static, self-contained body of pristine norms that existed in pre-colonial times. Sara Berry, Privatization and the 
Politics of Belonging in West Africa, in LAND AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING IN WEST AFRICA 241, 245 
(Richard Kuba & Carola Lentz eds., 2013).  Instead, they view custom as endlessly dynamic and in recent centuries 
developed “through interactions between colonial officials and their subjects, each drawing selectively on historical 
precedents to influence one another and make the best of changing circumstances.” Id. Colonial governments made 
attempts to define, and at times manipulate, custom in ways that supported the state’s authority. Squeezing Parakeets, 
supra note 8, at 652-55. But colonial and post-colonial states rarely succeeded in inventing custom from whole cloth 
and “have often exercised little real control of it.” Shipton & Goheen, supra note 9, at 308. 
52 See Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 656-57; Thomas Kelley, Apples to Oranges: Epistemological Dissonance 
in the Human Rights Case Hadijatou Mani v. Niger, 32 QUINNIPIAC U. L. REV. 311, 336-37 (2014). 
53 See Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 11-12 (arguing the Nigerien state passed several laws intended to limit 
traditional leaders’ authority over land); Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 658, n. 105-06 (arguing Niger’s post-
independence government passed laws aimed and curbing chiefs’ authority over land, all to little effect). 
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Niger’s rural land is still governed by it.54  From the perspective of a western-trained lawyer it can 
be diffuse and confusing,55 but it must be grappled with if one is to understand the profound legal, 
social, and spiritual transformation the country is undergoing as urban areas encroach on farm 
land.  The following discussion will introduce a somewhat idealized, archetypal version of 
customary land law before showing how it has been affected by colonialism, the rise of orthodox 
Islam, and the pervading influence of globalization and economic liberalism. 
A. The Customary Law Archetype 
 
Descriptions of customary land law in Niger tend toward static, archetypal accounts56 
when in fact it is dynamic, variable, and often messy.57 Still, the archetype is one that rural 
Nigeriens recount, sometimes wistfully, when discussing their communities’ historic relationship 
to land.58  Thus, even if it does not provide a perfectly accurate history of customary land law, it 
reveals much about rural peoples’ collective memory and values concerning land.59   
In rural Nigerien villages, the most enduring and powerful land rights are those of first- 
comers.60  Every village has a founding story, often involving brothers or male cousins who left 
 
54 Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 659-60 (arguing most rural people in Niger base land claims on custom and 
often have no knowledge and no desire to know what formal state law would say about the matter).  
55 Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1008. 
56 See Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 653 (arguing the French colonialists in Niger attempted to explain 
customary law in terms of fixed rules). 
57 See Janine M. Ubink, Tenure Security: Wishful Policy Thinking or Reality? A Case from Peri-Urban Ghana, 51 J. 
Afr. L. 215, 231 (2007) (arguing customary law in Ghana is “fluid, relational and negotiable”  and “constantly 
recreated and disputed); SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 230 (arguing Kenyan customary land law is endlessly dynamic); 
Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1006 (referring to Niger’s land use customs as “evolving, fluid, and 
negotiable”). 
58 Interview with Village Chief in Gassangourni, Republic of Niger (May 18, 2000) and Interview with Yaye Issa and 
Issafou Lali (May 22, 1996); Interview with Group of Villagers (ne 1, 1996); Interview with Group of Villagers in 
Fandou-Berri, Republic of Niger (May 17, 2000 (morning)). 
59 See id. 
60 Richard Kuba, Spiritual Hierarchies and Unholy Alliances: Competing Earth Priests in a Context of Migration in 
Southwestern Burkina Faso, in LAND AND THE POLITICS OF  BELONGING IN  WEST AFRICA 57, 60 (Richard Kuba & 
Carola Lentz eds., 2006) (arguing in a West African context that land rights arise from first-comers who made pacts 
with local deities); Sten Hagberg, Money, Ritual and the Politics of Belonging in Land Transactions in Western 
Burkina Faso, in LAND AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING IN WEST AFRICA 99, 103 (Richard Kuba & Carola Lentz 
eds., 2006) (referring to the oldest male descendant establishing land rights by forming an original pact with the 
spirits); Meyer, supra note 20, at 125 (arguing Niger’s land law is based largely on “rights of the first to clear”). 
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their natal village in search of adventure or due to a rift within their lineage.61  In some accounts, 
the men began by capturing slaves and forcing them to dig a well.62  The well became the 
symbolic and practical center of the new village.63  Starting from the circumference of the well, 
the founders traced pie-shaped lots of land that stretched indefinitely into the surrounding 
bush.64  Nobody paid close attention to the claims’ outer boundaries because land was an 
inexhaustible resource.65  Over time, men would solidify their claims to land by clearing the 
bush and tilling the soil.66  Although there seem not to have been hard and fast rules on the 
matter, leaving the land untouched for too long could weaken a claim of access. 67 
A father could generally expect that the land he controlled would pass to his sons since 
inheritance passed through the male line.68  The family land would never be formally divided, 
but each son would be apportioned a parcel that he would control until he divided it among his 
own sons.69  The lineage head, the village chief, the land chief (laabukoy), and the heads of 
families within the lineage would decide how the parcels of land would be divided among young 
men.70 
The first-comers formed alliances with the original black spirits (gangi bi) who inhabited 
 
61 See Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 663 (describing the village of Fandou Berri’s founding by a famous 
warrior and his brothers who captured slaves and compelled them to dig a well to sustain the village);  
62 Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 663 (describing the village of Fandou Berri’s founding by a warrior and his 
brothers who captured slaves and compelled them to dig a well to sustain the village); Unintended Consequences, 
supra note 9, at 1027 (describing a similar story regarding the village of Saabu Dey). 
63 JEAN-PIERRE OLIVIER DE SARDAN, LES SOCIETES SONGHAY-ZARMA (NIGER-MALI) 663 (1984) 
(describing the symbolic importance of well digging in Nigerien culture). 
64 Interview with Saabu Dey village chief and group of elders, in Saabu Dey, Republic of Niger (December 5, 2003).A 
somewhat different version of founders’ land rights, one I have heard only once, involves founders galloping on 
horseback, throwing spears into the earth, and vying to knock one another off if there was a disagreement about 
boundaries. Interview with Former Resident of Goudel (April 30, 2018). Interview with Niamey, supra note 38. 
65 See Meyer, supra note 20, at 125 (arguing agricultural land in Niger was historically abundant and “if a man had 
reason he could simply clear land and benefit from its fruits”) 
66 Id. 
67  Kelley, supra note 9, at 1007; Kelley, supra note 8, at 682, n. 176. 
68  Kelley, supra note 8, at 683. 
69  Kelley, supra note 8, at 681, n. 175. Typically, young males would work in their father’s fields, and would not be 
assigned a separate plot until they married. 
70  Kelley, supra note 9, at 1007. 
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the bush, and those alliances had to be nurtured and respected by subsequent generations.71  
Because the spirit world, like the temporal world, was dynamic and ever changing,72 other 
actors also came to inhabit the spiritual realm, including the spirits of villagers’ ancestors.73  If 
the spirits were pleased, villagers in the temporal world would prosper in their daily lives.74  The 
rains would fall gently and persistently, while locusts and other pestilence would stay away.  If 
the spirits were displeased, villagers would suffer crop failure, sickness, and death.75 
Some members of the community were particularly skillful at understanding and 
addressing the spirits’ demands.76  The land chief, often the same person as the village chief, 
would ensure that villagers’ use of land would not cause offense.77  In instances where the spirits 
had been offended, the community could organize a spirit possession ceremony to communicate 
directly between the realms.78  During these ceremonies, spirits would inhabit the bodies of 
certain villagers and speak directly to the gathered throng.79  Other villagers, referred to as 
zimas, were skilled at summoning the spirits to the temporal world to visit punishments and 
rewards upon living people or, conversely, to protect threatened humans from harm.80 
Chiefs in Niger historically played – and still play – important roles in determining access 
 
71  See Kelley, supra note 8, at 646. 
72  See id.  
73  See id, at 646-47. 
74  See id; see also Amadou supra note 61, at 9 (arguing villagers in a Nigerien river village, Karey Kopto, appeal to 
the spirits to ensure good fishing, good harvests, and to avoid sickness). 
75  Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1007; see Hagberg, supra note 60, at 99 (arguing earth priests 
and elders regard the earth “as a divinity and fear that the violation of rituals may endanger not merely the individual’s 
well-being but community life in general”). 
76  See Amadou, supra note 61, at 3 (describing a village chief in southern Niger who descended directly from village 
founders and who therefore had the ability to “remain in permanent contact with the invisible world,” appease the 
spirits and protect the village). 
77  Kelley, supra note 9, at 1007. 
78  Kelley, supra note 8, at 647. 
79  I witnessed a spirit possession ceremony in a rural Zarma village in 1987. A powerful storm had blown through the 
village destroying crops and several grass huts in which villagers lived. An interlocutor explained that participants 
wanted to know why the damage had been unleashed. When I asked whom they were communicating with, they 
answered “irikoy,” which translates to “our keeper.” It is the term that most Zarma people use when they referring to 
God in the Islamic tradition. 
80  See Amadou, supra note 61, at 4 (describing a zima as a priest healer and an ally of the spirits). 
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to land.81  Typically, only direct descendants of a village’s founders could vie for the position of 
village chief.82  Once selected, he had little prescriptive power and instead acted as first among 
equals, convening village leaders and lineage heads to form consensus.83  Niger’s history is 
replete with efforts by the state – at first the colonial regime, later post-independence 
governments – to manipulate, coopt, or diminish the chiefs and their authority.84  The position of 
village chief, has, however, endured and today is an intriguing amalgam. Chiefs are rooted in 
tradition and considered, at least in many communities, legitimate sources of authority.85 At the 
same time, they act as low-level administrators for the state.86  They collect taxes, conciliate local 
disputes, and, crucially, endorse land transactions.87 
Higher-level regional chiefs, generally referred to as canton chiefs (chefs de canton),88 
also exercised influence over land, but they enjoyed less historical legitimacy.89  Cantons were 
geographic regional divisions imported to Niger by the French colonizers.90  To aid their 
administration of the vast territory (one they had little interest in except its value in blocking 
Great Britain’s colonial expansion),91 the French invented chieftaincies to rule over the cantons 
 
81  See Kelley, supra note 9, at 1019; see also Meyers, infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (arguing rural 
people in Niger still prefer to deal with chiefs on matters involving land).  
82  See Kelley, supra note 8, at 653; Amadou, supra note 61, at 3 (arguing the chief of a village in southern Niger 
represents legitimate authority, that he presides over political and land-related decisions, and that the position of chief 
is elected from among descendants of the family of the first occupants). 
83  See Kelley, supra note 8, at 653. 
84 See Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 11 (arguing the colonial and post-independence governments passed various 
laws intended to diminish chiefs’ authority); see also Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 658, n. 106. 
85  See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 655 (arguing the position of village chief predated the arrival of 
the French and so its legitimacy survived colonialists’ machinations); Abdourahaman Chaibou, Les Judge, Le Cadis, 
le Chef et les Autres . . . REVUE JURIDIQUE DE SAMAN 5 (1998) (arguing chiefs in Niger act as both legitimate 
traditional leaders and as low-level agents of the modern state). 
86  See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 655 (arguing the position of village chief predated the arrival of 
the French and so its legitimacy survived colonialists’ machinations); Chaibou, supra note 85, at 5. 
87 See infra notes 297-301 and accompanying text. 
88 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 654. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See Meyer, supra note 20, at 97 (arguing the French occupied Niger to prevent the British from expanding 
northward from Sokoto (in present-day Nigeria) and to facilitate France’s plans to sweep across the continent from 
Dakar to Djibouti); Korling, supra note 20, at 43 (arguing the French’s interest in Niger was political and strategic, 
not economic); Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 651-52. 
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they had just created.92  In some instances, the canton boundaries were in approximate accord with 
the domains of pre-colonial regional chiefs, and the new chefs de canton retained at least some 
legitimacy in the eyes of rural people.93  But the French filled many of the chef de canton 
positions with their own toadies, including some who were said to come from Niger’s slave class 
and therefore lacked legitimate claim to positions of customary leadership.94 
Rural Nigeriens strongly prefer to resolve their disputes at the family or lineage levels.95  
To involve a chief in a dispute or, worse yet a state institution, is to admit that family patriarchs 
have failed in their duties.96   However, where disputes cannot be resolved by lineage heads, 
villagers call upon chiefs to conciliate.97  In deciding among competing access claims, chiefs 
apply no fixed rules and followed no established procedures.98  Instead, they gather historical 
evidence from villagers with the longest memories.99  Whose ancestor cleared the parcel of land 
at issue? Did the ancestor give the parcel to another individual, or was it only a loan? Who 
planted the fruit trees on edge of the parcel or dug the well, since both these actions are strong 
evidence of access rights?100  Having brought that history to light, the chief would steer the 
disputants toward a resolution.101  Crucially, the resolution often would take account of the 
 
92 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 654. 
93 Id. at 655. 
94 See Meyer, supra note 20, at 103 (arguing the first Canton Chief in Niamey was viewed as a French collaborator). 
95 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 668. 
96 Id. 
97 Based on many of performing ethnographic research in rural parts of Niger, I can report generally that land disputes 
arise for various reasons. Villagers might disagree over which founder laid claim to a particular tract of land, or indeed, 
whether a particular ancestor was or was not among the village founders. They might disagree about boundaries 
between fields, which typically were (and are) marked by narrow uncultivated strips of land and immovable objects 
such as trees. Often, especially in more recent times, village disputes involve disagreement over whether founder’s 
lineage gave a field to a late-comer and his descendants (in some instances slaves), or merely loaned it. 
98 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 670-71. 
99 See, e.g., Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 685-86. 
100 Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, Niamey, Republic of Niger (May 3, 2018). 
101  I participated in such a dispute resolution gathering in 1986 in the Nigerien village of Fandou Berri. At the time, I 
was a Peace Corps volunteer living in the village, and to demonstrate my bona fides, I cultivated my own half- 
hectare of millet, the staple crop. Not long before the harvest, a herder’s son fell asleep (at least that was his story) 
and his flock wandered into my field and ate much of my crop. In a country where most people’s livelihoods are 
based on subsistence agriculture, this was a gravely serious matter. The village chief and a respected marabout 
brought the shepherd’s father and uncles to my hut and, after much discussion, agreed that the family would 
apologize and, after the harvest, give me a quantity of their grain. I agreed that the resolution as fair, but declined to 
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interests of the disputing parties, but also of their ancestors (who now live in the spirit realm), 
the black spirits, and the unborn members of the community.102 
Chiefs also protected the prerogatives of secondary rights holders in rural land. Although 
men inherited access to agricultural land, their rights were not the equivalent of ownership.103  
Other members of the community might have durable, enforceable rights to other uses of the 
same land.104  For example, women, who are not necessarily from the man’s family unit, might 
have the right to gather straw to weave into mats as a source of pocket money.105  They might 
also have the right to pick sauce ingredients or plant a small garden.106  Traditional healers 
might have the right to harvest medicinal herbs.107   Anyone in the community might have the 
right to collect fodder after the harvest to feed farm animals.108  Younger men and slaves 
associated with the village might also have secondary, contingent rights in the land at issue. 
These rights are not necessarily secure use rights that would permit them to exclude others, but 
are culturally enforceable rights to plant and harvest crops to serve their specific needs.109 
From the existence of these durable, enforceable secondary rights under customary law, it 
 
accept the grain on grounds I was collecting a stipend from Peace Corps and could afford to feed myself. In the end, 
everyone was delighted: harmony was preserved. 
102 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 672. 
103 Id. at 682 (arguing agricultural land in Niger is subject to “overlapping use claims”). 
104 See SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 309 (arguing secondary rights holders in Kenya might claim access to thatched 
grass, fuelwood, wild foods, or sources of water and minerals); Lawrence C. Becker, Land Sales and the 
Transformation of Social Relations and Landscape in Peri-Urban Mali, 46 GEOFORUM 113,122 (2013) (arguing 
secondary rights holders in Mali might have access to pasture, wood collection, and other economic activities); 
Admos Chimhowu and Phil Woodhouse, Customary vs Private Property Rights? Dynamics and Trajectories of 
Vernacular Land Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 J. OF AGRARIAN CHANGE 346, 347-48 (2006) (arguing 
secondary rights in land act as “‘safety-net’ rights” for the community’s poor); see also CHRISTIAN LUND, 
LOCAL POLITICS AND THE DYNAMICS OF PROPERTY IN AFRICA 16 (2008) (referring to the same types of 
rights in land as “nested hierarchies of estates”); Aparna Polavarapu, Reconciling Indigenous and Women’s Rights to 
Land in Sub- Saharan Africa, GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 93, 114 (2013-2014) (referring to women’s secondary 
rights in land as “nested” rights) 
105 I base this statement on my own observation of women in the Nigerien village of Fandou Berri; see also Polavarapu, 
supra note 104, at 111 (describing women’s secondary land rights under customary law in Botswana). 
106 Kelley, supra note 8, at 682. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1007, 1015. 
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follows that the holders of primary rights – older male farmers – do not have the right to alienate 
their land.110  Indeed, how could an elder male presume the right to sell land to an outsider when 
rights in the land also extend to secondary rights holders, spirits from the past, and the yet- 
unborn? 
If customary law, which includes land law, functioned properly, the village would enjoy 
barka, a term and a concept that does not translate easily into English but includes a spiritual 
element which connotes general wellbeing and good luck.111 Barka arises when members of the 
village are living in harmony and the various actors in the spirit realm are appeased.112  So long as 
barka is maintained, the rains will fall regularly, crops will produce generously, and all will be 
well among the living.113   
To summarize this archetypal description of customary land law, access rights were based 
primarily on proving descent from village founders. All male descendants expected ongoing, 
predictable access to agricultural land.  Decisions about which land an individual could cultivate 
were made by elder males. These elder males included heads of family, lineage heads, and chiefs. 
Their decisions about access are influenced by the needs of the spirits and of secondary rights 
holders including women, later born men, and slaves. The man who farmed the plot of land could 
not be said to own it, because he did not have the right to exclude all others from it. Nor did he 
have the right to sell it. He could, however, count on primary access to that land during his 
lifetime, and could presume that his sons would inherit undivided shares of the same land. Village 
 
110 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 683; see Hagberg, supra note 60, at 104 (arguing those who attempt to 
sell lineage lands in rural Burkina Faso risk sanction from the spirit world). 
111 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 647. 
112 Id. 
113 To some skeptics, the notion of barka may sound suspiciously close to “harmony.” Some commentators have 
critiqued the “harmony” thesis of African village dispute resolution as unrealistic, even naïve. See infra note 345. 
However, based on my own fieldwork in rural Nigerien villages, I am confident that harmony and good relations 
between and among families is what they say they are trying to accomplish. Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 
8, at 694. 
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leaders who allowed this system of interlocking, overlapping, nested rights to deteriorate, risked 
the wrath of the spirits and the loss of barka. 
B. Complicating the Picture of Customary Law 
 
If the customary Nigerien land law described in the previous section is an ideal, the 
contemporary reality can be far more complicated, partly because outside influences have altered 
rural life and land. Although many rural Nigerien communities still rely on lineage heads and 
traditional chiefs to determine land rights, the second-half of the 20th century ushered in a 
profusion of new actors and institutions eager for a role in establishing the rules of the game and 
determining winners and losers. 
1. The Influence of Colonialism 
 
From the European colonial perspective, Niger was a mostly barren hinterland, so the 
French did not arrive on the scene until the dawn of the 20th century.114  France’s approach to 
colonialism, sometimes referred to as “direct rule,”115 assumed that their colonial subjects were 
uncivilized but that they could aspire – with sufficient tutelage – to evolve into civilized 
Frenchmen.116  One aspect of civilized life was private ownership and titling of land, which the 
French set about establishing in Niger.117  By the close of the colonial period in 1960, however, 
they had made little progress.118 
The fact was that although France claimed to practice direct rule, Niger was mostly an 
afterthought and so they limited their investment by settling for what the eminent anthropologist, 
 
114 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 651 (arguing France occupied Niger late in the colonial period, 
mainly to prevent Great Brittan’s colonial expansion in West Africa). 
115 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 652. 
116 Id; See Paul D. Ocheje, “In the Public Interest”: Forced Evictions, Land Rights and Human Development in Africa, 
51 J. AFR. L. 173, 185 (2007) (referring to France’s “civilizing mission” when it came to urban planning). 
117 See Ambe J. Njoh, Urban Planning as a Tool of Power and Social Control in Colonial Africa, 24 PLAN. PERSP. 
301, 306 (2009) (arguing it was French colonial practice to decree that the Civil Code would apply in land matters and 
that their motivation was to “legitimize their land entitlements” and commodify land) 
118 Njoh, supra note 117, at 309; Hagberg, supra note 60, at 101. 
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Sara Berry, has drolly referred to as “hegemony on the cheap.”119  When it came to land, that 
meant introducing the Code Napoléon, including individual ownership and registration of land, 
but doing little to enforce it beyond Niamey.120  It also involved declaring that all “unoccupied” 
land, which the French meant all land not subject to individual ownership, belonged to the 
state.121  Once again, however, the vast majority of the population simply ignored that rule and 
went on with their lives as before.122   
By the time of Niger’s independence in 1960, the land-related aspects of France’s 
civilizing mission had affected rural people in three limited respects.  First, it had introduced 
the concept, if not the reality, of individual ownership and titling of land.123  Rural people 
became vaguely aware that individual ownership of land was a possibility,124 even they viewed 
that possibility with disinterest or revulsion.125  Second, the French, who felt the need to 
provide housing for colonial officials as well as Nigerien functionaries that worked for the 
government, had begun seizing peri-urban farmland and subdividing it into house plots.126  At 
the time, that activity affected relatively few rural Nigeriens, but it set the stage for the rampant 
rural land loss which is happening today.127  Third, they created the quasi-traditional position of 
canton chief, which added powerful new actors to the governance of rural land.128  Otherwise, 




119 SARA BERRY, NO CONDITION IS PERMANENT: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF AGRARIAN CHANGE IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 23-24 (1993); Kelley, supra note 8, at 651. 
120 Njoh, supra note 117, at 306. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Meyer, supra note 20, at 100. 
124 See Kelley, supra note 8, at 682-83, n. 177 (recounting a village elder’s recollection that views about ownership of 
land began to evolve starting in 1960s). 
125 See id. at 681-82 (quoting a rural farmer saying “nobles do not divide their lands”). 
126 See infra notes 208, 210 and accompanying text. 
127 See infra text accompanying notes 261-268. 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 92-94. 
129 Njoh, supra note 117, at 306. 
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2. The Influence of Islam 
 
The rise of Islam in Niger, particularly the recent surge of fundamentalist Islamic 
practice, has had more impact on customary land law than the French ever achieved. Trans- 
Saharan traders introduced Islam to West Africa in the 8th century.130  In the mid-14th century, 
Mansa Mousa, the ruler of the West African Mali Empire, made the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca 
and wowed the world with his vast wealth.131  But Islam spread slowly through West Africa, 
mainly along trade routes.132   Niger – a territory always off the beaten track – was late to adopt 
the religion in its more orthodox forms.133 
Well into the 20th century, most rural Nigeriens professed Islam and adhered strictly to its 
Five Pillars134 but blended Islam with pre-Islamic spirit beliefs. Throughout my many visits to 
rural Niger over the past thirty years, pious Islamic friends have adjured me not to whistle, never 
to say nice things about a baby’s appearance, never to enter the bush before sunrise, and not to 
build a hut on the foundation of recently deceased ancestor’s home, all to avoid agitating the 
spirit realm.135 
Although it is true that until recently Islam has been a “stain not always deep”136 in 
Niger, that situation is changing. In recent decades, Niger’s supple blend of Islam and spirit 
worship has come under pressure from conservative Islamic influences emanating from the 
 
130 See Kelley, supra note 8, at 648. 
131 Al-Umari, Chapter Ten: The Kingdom of Mali and What Appertains to It, in CORPUS OF EARLY AFRICAN 
SOURCES FOR WEST AFRICAN HISTORY 252, 269-72 (N. Levtzion & J.F.P Hopkins, eds. 200 
132 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 648. 
133 See id. 
134 Thomas Kelley, Exporting Western Law to the Developing World, 39 GEO. WASH. INT. L. REV. 321, 339 (2007) 
(arguing most Nigeriens practice the Five Pillars of Islam, which are 1) the declaration of faith that there is only one 
God (Allah) and that Muhammad is God’s messenger; 2) the performance of five daily prayers; 3) the giving of alms to 
the poor and needy; 4) fasting during the month of Ramadan; 5) making the pilgrimage to Mecca, if one is able). 
135 See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 650, n. 70.  In an interesting sign of Niger’s syncretic religious 
practices, when villagers feel the need to protect themselves from vengeful spirits, or to provoke the spirits into 
harming their rivals, they consult an Islamic marabous for charms and incantations rather than visiting a zima, who was 
the traditional interlocutor to that realm. Amadou, supra note 61, at 158; see supra note 80 and accompanying text 
(explaining the powers of zimas). 
136 JEAN ROUCH, LES SONGHAY , 59 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France 1954) (1954) (“[e]n fait, l’Islam n’est 
q’une teinture plus ou moins profounde”). 
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Arabian Peninsula.137  Young men in particular are increasingly attracted to what Nigeriens refer 
to as “reformist” Islam, partly because it is presented by its promoters as a truer, purer, unsullied 
version of their religion and, at least according to some commentators, because it condemns 
Nigerien customs surrounding bride price payments, which place insuperable financial burdens 
on young men and sometimes prevent them from marrying.138 
This gradual but persistent rise of orthodox Islamic beliefs in Niger has led to three 
relatively recent changes in customary land law. First, and most simply, it has introduced Islamic 
religious leaders as an additional cadre of non-state actors willing to help settle land disputes.139  
By the 1980s, village patriarchs’ and village chiefs’ efforts to mediate land questions in rural 
communities routinely involved local Islamic marabouts as part of the process.140  In some 
intractable land disputes, it is now common for one or both parties to seek a ruling by a 
regionally prominent Islamic sheik141 or to a national Islamic association.142 
Second, land-related nostrums in the Koran have led rural residents to a gradual 
acknowledgement, if not yet acceptance, of individual ownership and inheritance of land.143  The 
 
137 See Hagberg, supra note 60, at 115 (arguing orthodox Islam disapproves of land priests, particularly any ritual 
addressed to land spirits). Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 9 (arguing Niger is undergoing an “emerging Islamic revival” that 
includes the growth of Islamic ascetic practices in daily life”). I have witnessed significant changes in Islamic practice 
during my 30 years of visiting rural Nigerien villages. To take only a few examples, village Islamic leaders no longer 
permit post-harvest tom-tom dances or traditional games of chance. Village women cover their heads or wear veils 
much more frequently than in the 1980s and 90s. Finally, villagers feel constrained when mentioning or invoking the 
spirits, though they still come into conversation regularly. 
138 See Interview with Young Man Working in Auto Parts Store, Niamey, Republic of Niger (March 4, 2009) (arguing 
“Izala” Muslims are popular among young men in Niamey because they condemn bride wealth payment). 
139 See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 668 (describing a land-related dispute in a rural village where the 
local marabout helped mediate). 
140 Id. 
141 See Kelley, Exporting Western Law, supra note 134, at 324-327 (describing an incident where disputing parties 
brought the matter to a prominent Islamic figure). 
142 See generally, Meyer, supra note 20, at 48 (arguing various Islamic actors, including the Islamic Association of 
Niger, sometimes “act in place of the state” in resolving land disputes). See Interview with Village Chief and Group of 
Elders, Saabu Dey, Republic of Niger (December 18, 2003) (recounting an instance wher parties to a land dispute 
swore oaths before officials of the Associatin Islamique du Niger); Interview with President of the Islamic Association, 
Cadis, and Chef de Canton’s Secretary, Say, Republic of Niger (February 25, 2004) (describing the procedure when 
disputants swear before the religious leaders from the Association Islamique du Niger). 
143 See Ali Abd Al-Kader, Land Property and Land Tenure in Islam, 5 ISLAMIC Quarterly 4, 5 (1959) (noting that 
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Koran calls for male descendants to share equally in land and female descendants to receive half- 
shares.144  Thus far, no one I have encountered in rural Niger has suggested abandoning the 
customary law that permits only men to inherit land; however, Islamic law, perhaps in 
combination with the French colonial legacy, has nudged rural people closer to the view that 
land is something to be owned and inherited individually without the mediating influence of 
traditional leaders.145 
Finally, the spirits, including the original gangi bi land spirits and the spirits of ancestors, 
today play a diminishing role in determining land use and outcomes. It is not that rural people 
believe there are no spirits; rather they believe that Islam is ascendant and that the spirits 
therefore have less power than they once did.146 
3. The Influence of Economic Liberalization 
Notions about individual ownership of land, registration of land rights, and the 
possibility of land sales, were pushed upon rural Nigeriens with much more force starting the 
late 1980s and 1990s with the rise of global liberalization.147   
In Niger’s case, the liberal agenda included, among other features, the passage of a 
comprehensive land reform law known as the Rural Code and overall government 
decentralization, both of which have affected land rights and laid the groundwork for the 
transformation of peri-urban land from communal custom to individual ownership.148 
The story of liberalization in Africa is long, complicated, and in some respects tragic,149 
but a summary version must suffice here.  When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet 
 
144 See Mirath, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM (P. Bearman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
145 See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 683 (arguing rural farmers’ understanding of the land the cultivate 
is “unsettled” and combines communal tenure with French and Islamic notions of ownership and inheritance). 
146 See id. at 649 (arguing rural Nigerien people feel free to blend Islam with spirit worship so long as the Muslim God 
is supreme); Interview with Former Resident of Goudel (April 30, 2018), supra note 38 (arguing the spirits do not like 
modernity and are losing power). 
147 Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1019-20. 
148  Kelley, supra note 9, at 1019-20. 
149  Id. at 1021 and n. 131; infra notes 164-173 and accompanying text; Kelley, supra note 9 at 1029. 
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Union collapsed, the United States became, at least temporarily, the world’s only superpower.150  
If poor countries in the Global South wanted help paying their bills, they could no longer count 
on playing the U.S. and the Soviet Union off of one another.151  They would have to agree to 
economic and political reforms dictated by the U.S., its allies, and the international financial 
institutions they controlled.152  Those policies collectively became known as the Washington 
Consensus.153 
The Consensus was geared toward shrinking and democratizing the state and allowing 
the free hand of the market to work its magic.154  Governments across Africa, if they wished to 
benefit from the Global North’s economic largess, were compelled to slash civil service rolls, 
eliminate regulations, privatize state-owned industries, roll back subsidies, and commit to free 
and fair elections and democratic governance.155 Another key tenet of the Washington 
Consensus was the need to privatize, title and register land.156  Based on the writings of the 
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, the assumption was that poor countries such as Niger 
remain poor because its citizens lack secure rights in their own land.157  The Nigerien farmer 
with no formal deed to the land he tills cannot pledge it as collateral to buy fertilizer or a tractor 
and thereby intensify his investment.158  As a result, he sits on an under-exploited pile of “dead 
 
150  See generally, Kelley, supra note 9, at 1029 (arguing the introduction of Western land laws and anti-slavery laws to 
Niger was causing Niger’s customary slaves to lost access to agricultural land). 
151  See Thomas Kelley, Beyond the Washington Consensus and New Institutionalism: What is the Future of Law and 
Development?, N.C. J. OF INT. L. AND COMM. REG. 539, 542 (arguing after the fall of the Berlin Wall Western 
nations interpreted their Cold War victory as proof of the value of unregulated free markets). 
152  See Kelley, supra note 9, at 1001 (arguing after the fall of the Berlin wall, African countries could no longer play 
“the Western and Eastern blocs off of one another"). 
153  Kelley, supra note 150, at 542; Kelley, Exporting Western Law, supra note 134, at 328. 
154  Kelley, supra note 150, at 542. 
155  See Kelley, supra note 134, at 327-28. 
156  Kelley, supra note 9, at 1002. 
157  Id.; see Tor A. Benjaminsen et al., Formalization of Land Rights: Some Empirical Evidence from Mali, Niger and 
South Africa, 26 LAND USE POL’Y 28, 29 (2008) (arguing De Soto’s book The Mystery of Capital gave direction to 
an entire new movement in law and development); see generally, HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF 
CAPITAL, WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). 
158  Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1002. 
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capital” and remains mired in poverty.159  The key to unlocking prosperity in poor countries, 
therefore, was the reform and formalization of land rights,160 which would allow property 
owners to “revive their ‘dead’ capital and generate surplus value from their assets.”161 
To summarize in one sentence the results of the Consensus economic policies – 
including land titling – they inflicted significant pain and suffering on poor people in the Global 
South while producing few of the advertised economic benefits.162  Nevertheless,  
Niger was an early and enthusiastic adopter Consensus policies, including land titling.163 
  
 In 1993, in keeping with the Consensus and just as the country was embarking on its first 
experiment with democratically elected government, it adopted a comprehensive new set of land 
laws, referred to as the Rural Code,164 aimed at bringing order and consistency to what aid experts 
and central government officials viewed as the country’s confusing jumble of land customs and 
practices.165  It was an enormously ambitious scheme that can only be summarized here.  It 
envisaged the creation of a series of land commissions at various levels of government and 
procedures by which those who control land could obtain and register individual title to it.166  In 
theory, the Rural Code and its administrative processes took a culturally sensitive approach to land 
reform in that it claimed that communal rights and secondary rights – the sort of customary land 
rights described in Part III.A., above – were eligible for registration and protection.167  However, as 
the Rural Code began to roll out, it became abundantly clear that government agents were intent on 
 
159  DE SOTO, supra note 157, at 163. 
160  See generally Benjaminsen et al., supra note 157, at 29. 
161  Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1002. 
162  See Kelley, Exporting Western Law, supra note 134, at 328-29 (arguing the track record of Washington 
consensus reforms “has been poor”); Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1002-3 (arguing studies 
of privatization find that “few of the predicted economic benefits actually materialized”).  
163  See Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1021 (arguing Niger launched a “full scale land reform 
effort” that aimed to “convert Niger from customary land tenure to a Western system of freehold ownership and 
titling”). 
164  Code rural [C. Rural.] [Rural Code] art. 93-115 (Fr.). 
165  Kelley, supra note 9, at 1022. 
166  See Meyer, supra note 20, at 249-50. 
167  See Kelley, supra note 9, at 1021. 
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registering land in the names of individuals, not groups, as part of an overall effort to comply with 
Consensus dictates and “modernize” Niger’s land laws.168 
Several excellent articles and books have been written about Niger’s attempts at land law 
reform.169  The short version is that in more than two decades, the reforms have had limited 
effect.170  Peasant farmers find the process of land registration cumbersome and expensive, and 
they still generally prefer to deal directly with traditional chiefs.171  The chiefs, who receive 
prestige and money by recognizing land claims and conciliating land disputes, encourage the view 
that nothing has changed, that other local political actors such as mayors and councilors are 
impotent, and that the Rural Code’s land commissions are a waste of time.172  Even where farmers 
are motivated to formally register their lands – and some are, particularly where there are disputes 
over access or the threat of state expropriation – the government often lacks resources and 
personnel to maintain the necessary registers.173
 
168  Id.; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, supra note 104, at 347 (arguing land registration schemes in Africa claim to register 
group rights but usually aim for individualized ownership “formalized in a written title to physically-demarcated 
land”); see also Lorenzo Cotula et. al., Land Tenure and Administration in Africa: Lessons of Experience and 
Emerging Issues 13 (2004) (arguing Niger’s Rural Code purports to respect customary rights but places the new land 
system firmly under the control of non-customary actors); UBINK, supra note 57, at 222 (arguing titling schemes in the 
African context often ignore secondary rights holders). 
169  See e.g., CHRISTIAN LUND, LAW, POWER, AND POLITICS IN NIGER: LAND STRUGGLES AND THE RURAL CODE IN 
NIGER (1998). 
170  Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 25 (arguing less than 3% of parcels of eligible land have been registered in 
Niger). 
171  Cotula et al., supra note 168, at 12; Andrew R. Falk, Ahead of the Curve: Promoting Land Tenure Security in Sub-
Saharan Africa To Protect the Environment, SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 35 (2016) (arguing titling schemes in sub-
Saharan Africa are often “arduous and expensive”); see Meyer, supra note 20, at 251. 
172  MEYER, supra note 20, at 252 (arguing canton chiefs use their customary authority to block or authorize land 
transactions even though they have not formal authority under the Rural Code). 
173  See Cotula et al., supra note 168, at 5 (arguing implementation of Niger’s Rural Code has been slow due to lack of 
resources). 
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4. The Influence of Government Decentralization 
As Niger’s government began implementing the Rural Code the early 1990s, it 
simultaneously dove into government decentralization, which is another aspect of the standard 
consensus liberalization package.174  Lawmakers hoped these two reforms would mesh 
seamlessly and that the new procedures for registering rural land would be carried out by 
grassroots officials, including locally elected councilors and mayors whose positions were 
created by the new decentralization legislation.175  That was not how things turned out.176 
The theory behind decentralization was that if responsibility for revenue collection and 
service delivery were pushed down from the central government to locally elected officials, 
there would be greater accountability and efficiency.177  Decisions on whether to invest in 
road maintenance or the construction of markets would be made at the local level and local 
people would hold their officials – local councilors and mayors whose offices had been 
created by the decentralization legislation – accountable for results.178  If local leaders spent 
public money unwisely or irresponsibly, or more to the point, if tax revenues disappeared as a 
result of corruption, local voters would know it and would elect new local representatives.179  
Likewise, decisions about land ownership and registration, whether in rural or urban areas, 
would be most accurately and efficiently carried out by local governments and local 
 
174  MEYER, supra note 20, at 110 (describing decentralization as one of the “watchwords” of democratization in 
Niger). 
175  See Cotula et al., supra note 168, at 12 (arguing countries in sub-Saharan Africa attempted to decentralize 
control over land within the broader context of political decentralization). 
176  See infra notes 183-186 and accompanying text; NJOH, supra note 27, at 549 (arguing that decentralization in 
Niger never really materialized). 
177  See KORLING, supra note 20, at 105 (arguing that aid agencies promoted decentralization as bringing 
governmental administration closer to the people and increased accountability, transparency, and efficiency, but that 
it just made local level governance more complex). 
178  Id. at 113 (a goal of decentralization was that citizens would see where their money was going, thereby 
legitimizing taxation). 
179  See id. at 106 (arguing decentralization in Niger was supposed to create accountability, transparency, and 
efficiency). Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5, Niamey, Republic of Niger (May 2, 2018) 
(arguing “it’s harder to see corruption when it’s farther away?). 
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officials.180  After all, they would be closest to the facts on the ground and they would be 
accountable to local land users.181  
More than twenty years in, most observers judge decentralization to be a failure both in 
rural areas and in Niamey.182  One problem was that, the scheme gave local governments major 
responsibility for service delivery – including responsibility for implementing the Rural Code’s 
new land registration procedures – but virtually no resources with which to achieve those 
tasks.183  Also, central government actors who had long enjoyed unquestioned authority were 
reluctant to surrender their prerogatives, including the rent seeking opportunities that go along 
with controlling finances, so they simply delayed and obfuscated when it came to devolving 
power to lower levels of government.184 
In the end, all that decentralization accomplished was to add a low-level, 
comparatively powerless set of government actors to an already crowded and chaotic 
institutional matrix.185 Before decentralization, a jumble of customary chiefs, Islamic 
religious leaders, and representatives of the central government vied with one another for 
legitimacy and power in both rural and urban areas.186  Decentralization laws added local 
councilors and mayors to the mix, a group that brought no historical legitimacy and no 
 
180  See Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5, Niamey, Republic of Niger (May 2, 2018). Former 
Mayor of Niamey Commune 5, supra note 180 (arguing land conversions were better managed by local commune 
governments, as opposed to the CUN government, because they were more accountable to local residents). 
181  Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (May 2, 2018). 
182  Korling, supra note 20, at 106-107 (arguing that in many areas decentralization simply made things more 
complicated by adding to the already confused jumble of political actors involved in land and the delivery of 
government services). 
183  Id. at 107-108; Cotula et al., supra note 168, at 5. Njoh, supra note 27, at 540. 
184 Korling, supra note 20, at 110 (arguing the subdivision of land was a “valuable resource” and “source of illicit 
enrichment” for governmental actors, and that the central government officials won the struggle against local 
governments). 
185 Id. at 106; see Meyer, supra note 20, at 24-27, 30-34 (arguing numerous Nigerien institutions vie with one 
another for authority over land transactions). 
186 See Meyer, supra note 20, at 24-27; 30-34. 
Kelley                                                                 Syracuse J. Int. L. & Comm. Vol. 47.1. 
 
 82 
additional resources with which to entice adherents.187  They ended up being easily out-
competed by central government authorities, who never removed their fingers from the purse 
strings, and by traditional chiefs, who either isolated them by convincing rural people to 
ignore them, or coopted them by having their own relatives run for local office.188 
The failure of decentralization has contributed to an atmosphere of “general 
dysfunction”189 when it comes to land registration in rural areas.190 Because there are no 
resources to create and maintain cadastral systems at the lower levels of government, and 
because there is constant competition from other actors, precious few parcels of rural land 
are actually being registered in rural areas.191 
In spite of these institutional failures, the Rural Code (including its plans for titling 
and registration of land) and government decentralization have in combination affected 
land and land use in peri-urban areas in two respects.  First, they have helped spread the 
word about the concept of individual ownership and registration of land.  Although land 
ownership is not an entirely new concept, having been introduced to rural communities by 
the French and by the rise of “reformist” Islam, until recently it has been more of a rumor 





187 Id. at 224, 251 (arguing the institutions of the state lack legitimacy in land matters, that people still turn to chiefs 
instead of local officials); Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 20 (arguing commune level governments in peri-urban 
areas lack the power the money to control land matters). 
188 Korling, supra note 20, at 106, 119-120. 
189 Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 21 
190 Id. at 24. 
191 Id. at 24 (estimating that 3% of rural land in Niger has been registered under the Rural Code). 
192 See, Kelley, supra note 9. 
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IV. The Death of Customary Law in Peri-Urban Niamey 
Peri-urban development around African cities tends to follow major paved roads that lead 
to the countryside, and eventually link to other major cities and towns.193  Since 1986, for more 
than 30 years, I have regularly traveled on Niamey’s Filingue Road, which heads east-northeast 
out of the capital toward the town of Filingue.194  Therefore, I have had a consistent reference 
point by which to track Niamey’s growth. As late as the mid-2000s, the Filingue Road had one 
gas station across from the Wadata Market, in what was the edge of the city. Drivers, including 
me, often filled up there before leaving town and venturing into the bush. There was sporadic 
development along the road beyond the gas station, but few permanent structures. As one exited 
the city, the landscape quickly turned to millet fields and tree nurseries. The first village, Saga 
Gourou, approximately 10 kilometers from the Wadata gas station, looked and felt as if it 
belonged to a different world, a rural world. 
When I drove out of Niamey along the Filingue Road in 2018, I counted eleven gas 
stations beyond my old fill-up spot.195  The road was lined with commercial buildings, 
compounds, and, behind that commercial strip, residential neighborhoods as far as the eye could 
 
193  See Janine M Ubink, Courts and Peri-Urban Practice – Customary Land Law in Ghana, U. GHANA L. J. 25 
(2002-2004) (arguing development of peri-urban areas in Ghana follows main roads because that is where 
electricity is most commonly available). 
194  I base my description of the Filingue Road, officially named RN 25, on decades of observation. I served as a 
Peace Corps volunteer in Niger from 1986 to 1988 and was posted in a village approximately 50 kilometers east- 
northeast of Niamey in the general direction of the town of Filingue. I regularly rode a motorcycle to and from 
Niamey along that route. In late 1990s, when I began performing ethnographic legal research in the same zone, I 
regularly traveled the Filingue Road in public transportation. Still later, when I had a Fulbright Scholarship in 
Niger from 2003-2004, I drove a private vehicle out the Filingue Road several times each week to perform 
fieldwork. I have continued to visit that zone regularly, most recently in May, 2018. 
195  See Interview with Hamdallaye Canton Chief, supra note 17 (describing development along the Filingue 
Road between Niamey and Hamdallaye). 
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see. The rampant development has engulfed the village of Saga Gourou. Clearly, something 
dramatic is happening to land around Niamey.196 
A. History of Land in Niamey and Environs 
 
The city of Niamey was, to a large extent, a colonial creation.197  Before the French 
arrived at the turn of the 20th century, there were several villages along the banks of the Niger 
River, in the area of present-day Niamey, but no significant cities or towns.198  During the 
early years of their colonial project in Niger, the French vacillated between Zinder and 
Niamey as their center of activity.199  But Niamey had attractive views of the Niger River and 
an airy plateau where the colonial overlords could build their offices and residences. In 1926, 
the French  established a permanent capital there.200 
The airy plateau favored by the French was located between two villages that became 
important actors in the story of Niamey’s peri-urban land transformation. To the west, and 
somewhat upriver, was the village of Goudel.201  To the east, and somewhat downriver, was 
the village of Gamkallay.202  Historically, their fields were divided by a watercourse and gully 
that now bisects Niamey.203  Today, both former villages are considered neighborhoods of the 
capital city.204 
 
196  NB: Much of this description, including the presence of the eleven gas stations beyond Wadata, can be verified 
on Google Maps. The first village, Saga Gorou, is not identified by name but you can see the settlement on the 
satellite version. 
197  Meyer, supra note 20, at 93. 
198  See id. (arguing in pre-colonial days, present-day Niamey was away from major trade routes and a “zone of 
refuge” for diverse peoples). 
199  NJOH, supra note 27, at 546. Meyer, supra note 20, at 99 (arguing the city of Zinder, located in eastern Niger, 
was a city of longstanding political and economic importance. 
200  MEYER, supra note 20, at 99. 
201  Id. at 94. 
202
 Id. 
203  See id.at 96 (arguing Gamkalle and Goudel originally controlled the land that later became Niamey and that 
the dividing line between them was the ravine of Gunti Yena, a stream that enters the Niger River). 
204  Based on personal knowledge, Gamkalle and Goudel are not the only villages incorporated into Niamey over 
the decades. For example, Gaway, a pre-colonial fishing settlement on the banks of the Niger River, was displaced 
during the 1970s to make room for the present-day Hotel Gawaye. The government moved Gaway’s residents 
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The French set about transforming land law in their new colony, but, as discussed in Part 
III, they made little progress in rural areas.205  The vast majority of Niger’s people simply 
ignored the putative changes in land law and went on with their lives as before.206 
But this was less the case in and around Niamey. By the 1950s, the colonial regime was 
beginning to carve up rural land on the city’s outskirts – largely in what had been the 
agricultural fields of Goudel and Gamkale – to produce subdivided residential parcels, mostly 
for civil servants and veterans who had regular salaries.207  Because the French did not 
recognize customary claims, they simply requisitioned what they considered empty land and 
dedicated it to their preferred uses.208 
 The colonists’ subdivision of land around Niamey for residential purposes was slow and 
steady until the late 1950s,209 when it began to accelerate as a result of economic growth, high 
birth rates, and two great droughts in 1972-73 and 1983-84.210   Rural people were being 
pushed by crisis but also pulled by opportunity as pre- and post-Independence governments 
focused their limited resources on developing schools, health care facilities, and other 
infrastructure in cities.211 The rapid growth in urban population outstripped the government’s 
 
across the Niger River to a newly settled area called Haro Banda and compensated them by granting them multiple 
subdivided house plots. Another village, Saga, had much of its territory expropriated by Niger’s government to 
build Diori Hamani Airport on what was then the outskirts of the capital. Today, Niamey has grown around and 
beyond the airport and Saga is considered a suburban neighborhood. 
205  See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text. 
206  Id. 
207  MEYER, supra note 20, at 105; see Korling, supra note 20, at 73 (arguing that since the colonial period urban 
planning in Niamey has focused on subdivision of land, but that the planning has always fallen behind actual 
expansion). 
208  Meyer, supra note 20, at 3. 
209  Motcho, supra note 48, at 2 (describing Niamey’s rapid population growth during the late colonial and early 
independence periods and rising demand for parcels of land). 
210  Meyer, supra note 20, at 109. 
211   Ocheje, supra note 116, at 187. 
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ability to convert land from farms to house plots,212 and the result was the appearance of 
informal, mostly unplanned neighborhoods around Niamey’s periphery.213 
When the French colonialists departed in 1960 and the post-independence 
government took control, little changed, at least in the realm of law.214  The newly 
independent country declared that the French Civil Code would continue to be the law of the 
land,215 and the vast majority of Niger’s citizens continued to ignore that formal law, just as 
they had under the French.216  In Niamey, however, the post-independence government held 
more sway than in rural areas and was able, at least to a certain extent, to continue the 
colonial land practices and policies.217   Particularly during the reign of Sayni Kountche, a 
military dictator who ruled from 1974-1987, the Nigerien state carried on with expropriating 
significant tracts of land on the periphery of the city, all by military decree, and dedicating it 
to providing housing for the city’s growing population.218 As was true during colonialism, 




212   Korling, supra note 20, at 73. 
213   Meyer, supra note 20, at 107 (arguing some of the informal neighborhoods were later formalized while others 
were not). 
214  Njoh, supra note 27, at 547, 549; Meyer, supra note 20, at 107. 
215   Njoh, supra note 27, at 550 
216   Njoh, supra note 27 (Niger’s post-independence governments periodically issued decrees and passed laws 
attempting to reform land practice. For example, in the 1970s, the military regime of President Sayni Kountche 
decreed a new policy of mise en valeur: the notion that henceforth all rural land would “belong” to those who were 
farming it); Kelley, supra note 8, Squeezing Parakeets Into Pigeon Holes: The Effect of Globalization and State 
Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, at 685. Many said that in fact this policy was Kountche’s attempt 
to remove or at least weaken chiefs’ power of land tenure matters; Kelley, supra note 8, Squeezing Parakeets Into 
Pigeon Holes: The Effect of Globalization and State Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, at 685. In 
the end, it really did not matter, since resilient rural Nigeriens largely ignored that policy too.. 
217  Meyer, supra note 20, at 107. 
218   See supra note 208 (arguing Niger’s post-independence governments seized his family’s lands without 
compensation and dedicated them to Niamey’s Green Belt); Kelley, supra note 8, at 138 (arguing the Kountche 
regime also continued the expansion of the colonialist’s Green Belt). 
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B. Decentralization Struggles Lead to Chaos in Urban and 
Peri-Urban Land Management 
Fundamental changes in land law, changes that have profoundly affected the lives and 
livelihoods of people living in peri-urban zones, did not accelerate until the 1990s, the era of 
economic liberalization, democratization, and government decentralization described in Part 
III, above. Niger, whether by choice or compulsion, fully implemented Washington 
Consensus reforms including land law reform and government decentralization.  While those 
policies had comparatively little impact in isolated rural areas,219 they began to alter peoples’ 
lives in peri- urban zones around the capital. 
The land transformation in and around Niamey began in earnest as an indirect result of 
government decentralization. In 2002, Niamey’s central government, the Urban Community of 
Niamey (“CUN”) was divided into five separate local governments, known as communes, each 
with significant responsibility for providing municipal services.220  Importantly, each of the 
urban communes had the authority to subdivide and sell land on its periphery.221  The 
communes quickly realized that the central government was going to do little to help pay for 
 
219 Njoh, supra note 27 (Niger’s post-independence governments periodically issued decrees and passed laws 
attempting to reform land practice. For example, in the 1970s, the military regime of President Sayni Kountche 
decreed a new policy of mise en valeur: the notion that henceforth all rural land would “belong” to those who were 
farming it); Kelley, supra note 8, Squeezing Parakeets Into Pigeon Holes: The Effect of Globalization and State 
Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, at 685. Many said that in fact this policy was Kountche’s attempt 
to remove or at least weaken chiefs’ power of land tenure matters; Kelley, supra note 8, Squeezing Parakeets Into 
Pigeon Holes: The Effect of Globalization and State Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, at 685. In 
the end, it really did not matter, since resilient rural Nigeriens largely ignored that policy too.; Meyer, supra note 20, 
at 107. 
220 Meyer, supra note 20, at 227. 
221 Meyer, supra note 20, at 111. 
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governmental services,222 and that converting peri-urban land from farms to house plots was a 
source of desperately needed revenue.223  
The communes quickly realized that the central government was going to do little to 
help pay for governmental services,224 and that converting peri-urban land from farms to house 
plots was a source of desperately-needed revenue.225  Not incidentally, subdividing and selling 
land also created rent-seeking opportunities for commune officials, of which they took full 
advantage.226  With these dynamics at play, the urban communes enthusiastically dove into the 
business of converting farmland around the city into subdivided house plots.227 
During this period, however, there was growing tension between Niamey’s newly 
empowered commune governments and the CUN.  From the CUN’s perspective, the 
communes squabbled with one another, refused to collaborate, and prevented the CUN from 
playing its rightful role as coordinator.228  From the communes’ perspective, the CUN simply 
 
222 Kelley, supra note 8, at 682; LOERENZO COTULA, ET. AL., LAND TENURE AND ADMINISTRATION IN 
AFRICA: LESSONS OFEXPERIENCE AND EMERGING ISSUES 13 (2004) (arguing Niger’s Rural Code 
purports to respect customary rights but places the new land system firmly under the control of non-customary 
actors); Ubink, Tenure Security, supra note 57, at 222 (arguing titling schemes in the African context often ignore 
secondary rights holders); Chimhowu & Woodhouse, supra note 104, at 347 (arguing land registration schemes in 
Africa claim to register group rights but usually aim for individualized ownership “formalized in a written title to 
physically-demarcated land”); Njoh, supra note 27, at 540 (arguing the decentralization that was supposed to 
accompany the Rural Code “never really materialized”); Meyer, supra note 20, at 224, 251 (arguing the institutions 
of the state lack legitimacy in land matters, that people still turn to chiefs instead of local officials); Bron-Saidatou, 
supra note 26, at 20 (arguing commune level governments in peri-urban areas lack the power the money to control 
land matters) 
223 See Interview with Former Mayor of Commune 5 of Niamey, Niamey, Republic of Niger (May 2, 2018) (arguing 
the communes produced revenues from developing peri-urban land and spent it on service provision); Meyer, supra 
note 20, at 227; Korling, supra note 20, at 109 (arguing zoning power appeared to the commune governments as a 
“golden opportunity” to produce revenue). 
224 See Korling, supra note 20, at 108 (arguing commune governments were given much responsibility for service 
delivery but few means to raise funds). 
225 Meyer, supra note 20, at 227 (arguing that subdividing land provided revenues to commune-level governments). 
226 See Korling, supra note 20, at 81 (arguing that the process of subdividing land is complicated and corrupt); 
Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing that in the 1990s the communes were practically the only ones subdividing land around 
Niamey and that corruption had been at the heart of the system). 
227 Meyer, supra note 20, at 233. 
228 Id. at 227 
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did not want to relinquish its centralized power.229  By 2011 the struggle between Niamey’s 
communes and the CUN was over and, for political reasons beyond the scope of this article,230 
the CUN had reasserted control of city government, including the development of peri-urban 
land.231  The CUN’s inability to handle the volume of land transactions and the entry of private 
developers to the market conjunctively catalyzed chaos in peri-urban land development.232 
C. Enter the Private Developers 
 
Before the CUN mayor’s office could bring order to peri-urban land development, it 
was overtaken by the arrival of private land developers in the market.233  Legal changes in the 
late 1990s authorized private development,234  but its influence was not felt until the mid-
2000s when a governmental decree definitively removed the state’s monopoly and made it 
possible for anyone possessing peri-urban land to subdivide and sell it.235  The idea was to 
unburden the government from constantly having to search for resources to carry out 
necessary improvements for the process of converting agricultural land to house plots: the 
provision of roads, public buildings, water, electricity, and  other infrastructure.236  The effect, 
however, was to permit private actors, particularly those with working capital, to suddenly and 
entirely take over land development on the edge of the city.237  There has been a boom in the 
 
229 Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (May 2, 2018), supra note 180. 
230 In brief, Niger experienced a coup d’état in 2010 and the military government preferred to govern the city by 
naming its own top officials.  See Meyer supra note 20, at 228. 
231 Id. at 113, 22 
232 Id. at 228 (arguing the CUN mayor’s office attempted to centralize all land-related record-keeping, resulting in 
boxes of disorganized records piled high in the corridors, complete lack of file verification, and some parcels being 
sold multiple times). 
233 Id. at 229. 
234 Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing many private developers entered the Niamey land market after legal reforms in 
1997); Meyer, supra note 20, at 118. 
235 Meyer, supra note 20, at 227, 229 (arguing private developers were not fully able to participate in development 
of peri-urban land until a government decree in 2000). 
236 Id. at 229. 
237 Id. at 235, 238. 
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development of peri-urban land since 2010,238  and every new subdivision around Niamey has 
been undertaken by private developers.239 
Most of the leading private actors have been individuals who, through personal 
contacts and prior experience, know how to navigate the tortuous bureaucratic process 
involved in converting farmland into suburbs.240  Some acquired their knowledge by 
working on the inside of the state bureaucracy and their core expertise is keeping up on the 
constant modifications to the arcane procedural requirements.241  Others have become 
powerful private actors because of family ties to chiefs in the peri-urban zones.242  They use 
their connections to identify potential sellers of land and to negotiate with lineage heads.243  
The former group of intermediaries  are familiar with the corridors of power and the constant 
flux in the rules, while the latter keep tabs on who owns which lands and who might be 
convinced to sell.244  The most effective of the middlemen combine both competencies.245  
They propose their service directly to customary owners, offering  the enticing possibility of 
selling their land without having to engage directly with the distasteful, even dreaded, 
government bureaucracy; and often offering better terms than those offered by commune-
level mayors’ offices (before municipal government was re- centralized) or the CUN (before 
it was squeezed out of the game).246 
The entrance of private developers into peri-urban land markets have led to the 
 
238 Id. at 242. 
239 Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing private developers have become more powerful actors than government); Meyer, 
supra note 20, at 229. 
240  See Meyer, supra note 20, at 236. 
241
  Id. 
242
  Id. 
243
  Id. 
244   Id. 
245   See Meyer, supra note 20, at 239. 
246  Id. at 237. 
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emergence of symbiotic, mafia-like networks between the private actors and government 
officials.247  The developers, many of whom have grown vastly wealthy, grease the necessary 
palms in the state bureaucracy to ensure their development plans are approved,248 whether or 
not those plans comply with state requirements, or the best practices for infrastructure, public 
space, and the like.249  In recent years, the developers’ corrupt influence is rumored to go even 
deeper and higher.250  Some have become so wealthy that they are able to pour vast amounts 
of money into electoral campaigns to ensure the election of officials who are sympathetic to 
their projects.251  Once this is accomplished and their friends are in office, the tortuous 
governmental regulatory and permitting processes become crystal clear and streamlined for 
the politicians’ patron but remains tortuous and opaque for the patron’s competitors.252  It is 
common knowledge in Niamey that these relationships reach the highest levels of 
government, which means no bureaucrat, at any level of the state apparatus, can safely 
impede the private developers’ plans – whether for corrupt or legitimate public safety 
reasons.253 
 
247   See id. at 241. 
248   See Korling, supra note 20, at 80, 91 (arguing the sale of peri-urban house plots is the source of corrupt 
practices, that Niamey city hall is a “locus of negotiations and access,” and that government officials are typically 
bribed by offering them plots in the subdivisions they authorize); Interview with Former Niamey Mayor of 
Commune 5 (insert interview source, and location) (May 2, 2019), supra note 180 (arguing “[t]he only way to 
move a [housing] project forward is to engage in corruption” by paying ministry officials). 
249   See Korling, supra note 20, at 90; Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (insert interview 
source, and location) (May 2, 2019), supra note 180. 
250  See Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (insert interview source, and location) (May 2, 2018), 
supra note 180 (arguing the land system around Niamey is “full of corruption,” that faulty development plans are 
routinely approved by corrupt CUN officials, and that the office of Niger’s president overrules decisions by lower 
level government offices that might block development plans). 
251  Meyer, supra note 20, at 241. 
252  Id. 
253   See id. at 244-245, 259; see generally Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (insert interview 
source, and location) (May 2, 2019), supra note 180 (arguing his private business was suffering because those in 
political power were steering business away from him). 
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As in rural areas,254 in peri-urban zones there is an ongoing struggle over who has 
formal authority to authorize the transition from farmland to suburban house plots.255  Chiefs 
in peri- urban zones vie with formal CUN officials, who in turn vie with various central 
government ministers and their underlings whose portfolios touch on land development.256  
But since the entrance of wealthy, politically connected private developers onto the scene, the 
contest for formal authority matters less257 because the private actors simply push aside the 
competing organs of the state and carry out their development plans in whatever way will 
maximize their profits.258  The state has become one actor among many, and in most instances 
it not the most powerful one.259  The result, discussed in more detail in Part V., below, is that 
it has become “impossible to manage the peri-urban land for the good of all, especially for the 
lowest level of society.”260 
D. The Current Situation 
Today, land in the vicinity of Niamey is coveted and the market is frenzied.261  Although 
the large private developers described above are dominant players and reap the greatest rewards, 
it seems that everyone with capital to invest is jostling to get into the game.262  Business people 
 
254   Meyer, supra note 20, at 225. 
255  Meyer supra note 20, at 225. 
256  Id. at 211, 225, 256 (arguing the Ministries of Environment, Urbanism, Cadaster, and Education all have 
claims to authorize peri-urban land transactions, but that Urbanism is the most powerful so private developer 
with clout skip the other ministries and go straight to Urbanism). 
257  See Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing the developers and their highly placed patrons in central government succeeded 
in pushing the lower level commune governments out of the way even though they were supposed to have authority 
over subdividing land); Meyer, supra note 20, at 225. 
258  Meyer, supra note 20, at 224; Interview with A Highly Placed Official in Niger’s Ministry of Environment and 
of Durable Development, Niamey, Republic of Niger (May 11, 2018) (arguing the rise of private developers means 
no one is taking account of the public interest and it is now all about generating profit). 
259  Meyer, supra note 20, at 225. 
260  Id. 
261  See Issaka, supra note 1 (employing the French term “combat foncier” meaning “land combat” to describe 
the real estate market in peri-urban areas around Niamey). 
262  See Interview with Retired Office Worker, Niamey, Republic of Niger (insert interview source, and location) 
(April 28, 2018) (describing his purchases of various empty house lots in towns near Niamey); see also Interview 
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who have no background in land development and whose main activities focus on general 
commerce or transportation, are buying up empty lots in the fast-spreading peri-urban 
neighborhoods with an eye toward flipping them or developing them.263  Those with sufficient 
means purchase the lots in large quantities,264 often in cahoots with government officials with 
whom they split the profits when prices rise.265  While others purchase large tracts of agricultural 
land located far from the city;266 and some plan to subdivide the land quickly and sell to smaller-
scale speculators.267  Others intend to sit on the distant land until the fast-expanding city 
approaches their holdings and pushes the value upward.268 
Poor urban Nigeriens are nowhere to be seen in this scramble for peri-urban land. The 
government, with the support and advice of aid agencies, has begun in recent years entering into 
public-private partnerships to establish new logement social (“social” or “affordable” housing) in 
 
with Two Real Estate Developers, Niamey, Republic of Niger (insert interview source, and location) (April 30, 
2018) (discussing where one developer was a former lawyer and the other was until recently a “documentary 
filmmaker” and still had that profession on his business card). 
263  See Interview with El Hadji Merchant, Niamey, Republic of Niger (insert interview source, and location) (May 
4, 2018) (describing a merchant with no development experience revealing his plans for developing recently 
purchased peri-urban land); Interview with a Businessman, Niamey, Republic of Niger (insert interview source, and 
location)  (May 4, 2018) (describing an uneducated businessman with no prior experience in land development 
revealing his participation in a large peri-urban social housing development); Interview with Two Real Estate 
Developers, supra note 262 (describing two principals of a social housing project, one a former lawyer, the other a 
documentary film maker). 
264  See e.g., Interview with El Hadji Merchant, supra note 263. 
265  Meyer, supra note 20, at 225. 
266  See Interview with Two Real Estate Developers, supra note 262 (describing a housing development located 
approximately 30 kilometers from Niamey); Interview with El Hadji Merchant, supra note 263 (describing his 
purchase and conversion of land approximately 20 kilometers outside of Niamey). 
267  See Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing many speculators have entered Niamey’s land markets); Cotula et. al., supra 
note 168, at 27 (arguing many urban elites are speculating in peri-urban land markets). 
268  See Interview with El Hadji Merchant, supra note 263 (arguing he will leave much of his recent peri-urban 
land purchase “in reserve” to allow prices to rise). 
Major business actors are not the only ones fueling the red-hot peri-urban land markets. Peri-urban land 
is one of Niger’s few investment opportunities, so many salaried employees (primarily civil servants) are 
purchasing multiple undeveloped plots in recently subdivided neighborhoods outside of town, often while living 
in small rented lodgings in the city. Meyer, supra note 20, at 233. In fact, it is rare that the first purchaser of a 
newly subdivided plot actually constructs a house and moves in. Id. Most initial buyers are investors and often it 
is the second or third purchaser who constructs a residence. Id. at 234 ((offering an example of one house plot in a 
peri-urban neighborhood that originally was purchased for 60,000 CFA (approximately $ at current exchange 
rates), that changed hands twice, and eventually sold for 2 million CFA to the person who constructed a house.) 
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peri-urban zones.269  However, in spite of the “social” moniker, little, if any, of the resulting 
housing is within the means of poor people.270  
From the perspective of an academic studying land in Niger, this is a fascinating 
transitional moment in which the rules governing peri-urban land and land use are changing 
rapidly.  But from the perspective of farmers living in peri-urban zones this transition signals 
and end to a way of life.  Whether their land is purchased by a developer, or condemned by the 
state, once official title has been printed and properly registered, the purchaser’s rights are 
secure and the rural people, along with their rural beliefs, rural ways of life, and rural 
livelihoods, are out of the game.  The transition to suburbs is irreversible271  and the land 
becomes a commodity like oranges on special in Niamey’s Petit Marche.272 
 
269  Alexandra Biehler, Armelle Choplin, Marie Morelle, Le Logement Sociale en Afriquie: Un Modele a 
(Re)inventer?, (May 18, 2015), available at https://www.metropolitiques.eu/Le-logement-social-en-Afrique-
un.html (Last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (at p .1 arguing NGOs and international agencies have supported social 
housing). Meyer, supra note 20, at 240 (mentioning social housing in Niger and arguing it does not benefit the 
poor). 
Based on personal observation, these social housing neighborhoods are popping up like mushrooms in 
rural areas around Niamey. Because they are being developed well outside the boundaries of the city, they can be 
a startling, incongruous sight as one drives through the bush. The completed neighborhood can include hundreds 
of residential units, typically a mix of one, two, and three-bedroom cement, metal-roofed houses, each with a 
small, walled concession surrounding it, all packed closely together. See Interview with Two Real Estate 
Developers, supra note 262 (describing a social housing site under construction approximately 30 kilometers 
from Niamey). They often are completely surrounded by agricultural fields where farmers go about their 
traditional routines of planting and cultivating subsistence crops and husbanding their animals. See id. (describing 
a new social housing site next to what appeared to be a millet field). 
270 Interview with Two Real Estate Developers (insert interview source, and location) (April 30, 2018), supra note 
262 (in a typical social housing project, the government and private financial institutions combine forces to make 
mortgages available to prospective purchasers. The banks agree to loan money at comparatively moderate rates of 
interest and the government agrees to deduct the monthly payments directly from the borrowers’ paychecks. This 
means, of course, that only Nigeriens with regular paychecks, or who live overseas – together a wafer-thin slice of 
Niger’s population – can take advantage of the programs); see KORLING, supra note 20, at 79 (arguing Niger claims 
that provision of housing for the poor is a key to poverty reduction but in fact has provided exceedingly little that is 
accessible to the poor).  
271 See Interview with Two Real Estate Developers (insert interview source, and location) 
 (April 28, 2018), supra note 262 (arguing that once they have formal title in hand, they have no fear that farmers 
will be able to challenge their ownership of land).   
272 Meyer, supra note 20, at 235; see Interview with Former Gamkalle Resident and His Friend (May 5, 2018), supra 
note 208 (arguing that “land has become money”); Interview with Insurance Executive, Niamey, Republic of Niger, 
(May 5, 2018) (arguing “land was religious; now it is money”). 
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Niamey was created during the colonial era on land expropriated from the nearby 
villages of Gamkale and Goudel.  As the city’s population steadily grew, the colonial 
government expropriated and subdivided land on its periphery–land that the French considered 
vacant–to provide residences for its functionaries.  Once the land was subdivided, it was subject 
to the Code Napoléon.  However, the scale of this conversion was modest; most rural people 
were unaffected, and their lives continued as before. 
Niger’s post-colonial governments carried on in a manner similar to the French.  As 
Niamey’s population growth accelerated, the state expropriated and converted larger swaths of 
surrounding land, primarily still from the domains of Goudel and Gamkale.  At times, 
population growth outstripped the government’s ability to subdivide land, and so informal 
settlements began to appear on what had been agricultural land. 
Starting in the 1990s, democratization, economic liberalization, and decentralization, 
combined with accelerating population growth in Niamey, led to a dramatic increase in the 
city’s expansion and an accompanying flood of land conversions from fields to suburbs.  
Various sources of authority–the CUN, central government ministries, local government 
officials, and chiefs–vied with one another for authority over peri-urban land transactions and 
attendant spoils.  However, beginning in 2010, most of the governmental actors were shoved 
to the side by the entrance of private land developers, who formed mafia-like networks in 
cahoots with high government officials.  Suddenly, all limits to peri-urban land development 
vanished and a scramble for profits ensued.  Developers and speculators began purchasing, 
subdividing, titling and registering formerly agricultural lands at a blistering pace, sometimes 
scores of kilometers outside the city.  The private developers had no reason to care about poor 
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people which included the peasant farmers selling their ancestral lands.  The government of 
Niger claims they provide “social housing” to meet the needs of the poor, but in fact only 
comparatively well-off Nigeriens are eligible to participate. 
The next section explores who wins and who loses as a result of Niger’s peri-
urban transformation. 
V. Winners and Losers When Peri-Urban Land is Transformed from 
Customary to Formal 
The physical and legal transformation of peri-urban land around Niamey produces 
winners and losers.273  In general, the winners are those with power and wealth who take 
advantage of the transition to increase their bounty.274  The losers are peasant farmers whose 
livelihoods disappear and who forfeit the historical and spiritual foundations that have until 
now have provided order and meaning to their lives.275 
A. Winners 
 
Among scholars, it is a generally accepted nostrum that legal transformations in poor 
countries benefit elites.276  The reason is obvious: elites are better positioned to shape the 
details of the new legal rules to serve their own interests.277  Once the new rules are in place, 
 
273 See HAGBERG, supra note 60, at 102 (arguing peri-urban land sales always produce winners and losers and that 
rural people are usually the losers); see SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 144 (arguing early practitioners of land 
privatization and titling in Kenya, which was a precursor to such efforts across sub-Saharan Africa, assumed 
“energetic or rich Africans will be able to acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less, creating a landed and 
landless class” and that “[t]his is a normal step in the evolution of a country”). 
274 See Beacon Mbiba and Marie Huchzermeyer, supra note 2 (arguing local elites including officials, politicians and 
traditional authorities often control land entitlements); Falk, supra note 171, at 1 (arguing land tenure reform always 
ends up redistributing land from the poor to the rich); Polavarapu, supra note 104, at 98 (arguing that in Botswana 
land tenure security is enjoyed only by the “rich and legally adroit”); COTULA, ET. AL., supra note 168, at 3 
(arguing “elites claim land that isn’t theirs when they know registration is coming”). 
275 See supra notes _ and accompanying text. 
276 See Korling, supra note 20, at 78 (arguing in Niger urban policy and investment always serves elites); SHIPTON, 
supra note 8 (arguing when land is converted from customary control to freehold title, “the best-informed and best- 
connected people” benefit); Ubink, Tenure Security, supra note 57, at 222. 
277 See Njoh, supra note 27, at 542 (arguing changes in zoning laws usually protect the rights and privileges of the 
wealthy). 
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they have the necessary knowledge, capital, and connections to consolidate their advantages 
before less informed societal actors become aware of the shift.278  The transformation of land 
law in peri- urban Niger is a case in point.279 
1. Private Real Estate Developers and Investors and the 
Government Officials with Whom They Collaborate 
Private developers have emerged as the biggest winners in the conversion of peri-urban 
land.  At the top of the developer pyramid are the leaders of the mafia-like networks that have 
infiltrated and dominated all levels of the state apparatus, and who have amassed fortunes by 
converting large swaths of agricultural land into house plots.280  But those land kingpins are 
not the only private real estate actors who have thrived as a result of the transition. 
Lower tiers of private developers have gotten into the game.  Companies are forming 
in Niamey to build the social housing developments around the city’s periphery.281  Some 
complain that their profit margins are thin. However, the recent profusion of these project 
indicate that they are generating profits.282 
A third tier of wealthy elites benefit from the conversion of peri-urban land.  These are 
the wealthy El Hadji merchants from the city who until now have had few options for 
diversifying their investments within Niger.283  They are moving into land speculation, buying 
large tracts of undeveloped agricultural property, sometimes twenty or more kilometers from the 
 
278 See JIMU, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing that in African contexts urban actors seeking land can take advantage of 
the poverty and ignorance of rural sellers). 
279 See Njoh, supra note 27, at 542; see infra Part V.B. 
280 See Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing certain private developers of peri-urban land have become more powerful than 
governmental actors). 
281 See supra note _. 
282 See Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing corporations have entered the land development market and have made 
substantial profits). 
283 Id.; Interview with El Hadji Merchant (insert interview source, and location) (May 4, 2018), supra note 263. 
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city.284  Different merchants employ different strategies.  Once they have established titled 
ownership of the land, many subdivide it into plots even if they intend to sit on it until Niamey 
grows closer and the value of the plots increases.285  Some intend to sell the plots piecemeal to 
other smaller investors, or even to potential residents.286  Still others have grander plans to move 
into the business of real estate development by constructing the social housing projects described 
above.287  Whatever the details of their development strategies, wealthy businessmen based in the 
capital are mobilizing to take advantage of the shift to private ownership of land.  
These private developers become so successful partly by collaborating with government 
officials who can claim formal authority over land transactions.  There is still lively competition 
among the governmental actors to determine whose authority will prevail, but as the competition 
plays out it is clear that many are prospering.  They formed corrupt symbiotic relationships that 
strengthened their claims to authority over government institutions and, simultaneously, 
produced significant private wealth.288 
Amidst this struggle for legitimacy and advantage among multifarious organs of the 
state apparatus, traditional chiefs – historically a resilient and adaptable group289-- have found 
 
284 See Interview with El Hadji Merchant (insert interview source, and location) (May 4, 2018), supra note 263 
(describing his speculative investment in peri-urban land outside Niamey). 
285 Id. 
286 Id.  
287 Id. 
288 It should be noted that there is another class of people, who will be mentioned only in this note, that both win and 
lose as a result of the symbiotic relationship between major real estate developers and corrupt governmental 
officials. They are civil servants of moderate means who are searching for housing in the vicinity of Niamey. They 
are winners because the entry of private developers on the peri-urban scene has increased the number of houses and 
house plots available for purchase. See Meyer, supra note 1 (arguing Niger’s efforts to create housing and financing 
for civil servants has worked). They are losers because the resulting neighborhoods and houses are often poorly 
planned and constructed; See also Issaka, supra note 1. Because the developers are in cahoots with the government 
officials, they can maximize profits by making roads too narrow for fire trucks, eschewing drainage infrastructure, 
and failing to reserve space for public utilities. Id. With regulators looking the other way, they also save money and 
increase profits by constructing homes using substandard materials. Id. 
289 See Kelley at note 8 & 9. 
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opportunities to enhance their power and wealth.290  With peri-urban land in high demand and 
ambiguity concerning which state actors have the power to convert land from farms to 
suburbs, rural Nigeriens have turned to chiefs, who retain much of their customary authority 
over land in spite of the state’s efforts to weaken it.291 
Traditional chiefs’ approaches to peri-urban land transactions are as variable as those of the 
state. Some village and canton chiefs expand their pocketbooks and their power by taking an 
active role in facilitating the transfer of agricultural land to urban investors or developers.292  In a 
typical transaction, a developer from the city will approach a traditional chief whose rural 
domain is 20 or more kilometers from the edge of Niamey’s existing suburbs.293  The chief will 
act as a broker, identifying a family patriarch willing to sell a large tract of family land; 
sometimes with, sometimes without the extended family’s informed consent.294  The chief may 
take a finder’s fee that includes cash or a percentage of the house lots to be developed.295  In 
other instances, chiefs simply sell large tracts of undeveloped “chief’s lands” to investors even 
though customarily they are guardians of that land and not owners.296  
 
290 See Janine M. Ubink, Courts and Peri-Urban Practice, supra note 194, at 28 (arguing in villages chiefs are major 
actors in converting peri-urban land from agricultural to residential and that they often are the prime beneficiaries); 
Benjaminsen, et.al., supra note 157, at 31 (arguing land shortages combined with increasing desire to formalize land 
rights has provided a financial boon to traditional chiefs). 
291 See COTULA ET. AL., supra note 168, at 12 (arguing land titling schemes in Africa did not work well, which 
led to increases in chiefs’ power over land). 
292 Interview with Retired Office Worker (April 28, 2018), See supra note 262 (recounting his purchase of plots of 
land that were endorsed by canton chiefs). 
293 Interview with Two Real Estate Developers (April 30, 2018), See supra note 262 (arguing their social housing 
project, located approximately 30 kilometers outside Niamey, began with a purchase of land from farmers); 
Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (May 2, 2018), See also supra note 180 (arguing most peri-
urban land sales begin when a buyer approaches the head of a family). 
294 See Janine M. Ubink, Courts and Peri-Urban Practice, supra note 194, at 37 (arguing chiefs in Ghana sometimes 
connive with family elders to sell land out from under the control of extended families). 
295 Interview with Retired Office Worker (April 28, 2018), See supra note 262 (arguing that when land is 
subdivided, the chiefs always get their cut and providing the example of Niamey’s Haro Banda neighborhood, where 
20% of all the newly created plots were divided among chiefs and government officials); See also Motcho, supra 
note 48, at 7 (arguing chiefs have become central actors in suburbanization and that they profit by, among other 
things, receiving compensation in the form of parcels). 
296 See Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 10, 27 (arguing under customary law chiefs are guardians of undeveloped 
land, not owners); see also Interview with Canton Chief of Koure (May 3, 2018), supra note 100 (claiming – 
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Even chiefs who do not take an active role in selling or developing peri-urban land 
benefit from the transactions, at least in the short term.  When investors or developers arrive in 
the village and come to agreement with a family patriarch, the chief, for a fee, will create a 
written document referred to as a detention coutumiere (customary holding).297 That document 
represents the developer’s or investor’s first step in the long and tortuous process (one that is 
simpler for the land development kingpins with political connections)298  of obtaining full, 
individual ownership and registered title over the land.299  In theory, the chief investigates the 
transaction before granting the detention coutumiere, ensuring that the seller has a legitimate 
claim over the land and that the seller’s family, many of whom may claim primary or secondary 
rights in land, approve of the sale.300 However, as described in Part V.B.1. below, the sales often 
proceed without the extended family’s knowledge or acquiescence. 
 
incorrectly – that in pre-colonial Niger all land “belonged” to canton chiefs and that in recent time some village 
chiefs have claimed ownership of land, obtained title, and sold it to developers); Interview with a Highly Placed 
Official in Niger’s Ministry of the Environment and of Durable Development (May 11, 2018), See The World 
Factbook at note 20 (arguing village chiefs in Niger claim ownership of vast tracts and “profit personally from the 
sales”); Ubink, Courts and Peri-Urban Practice, supra note 194, at 30 (arguing chiefs in Ghana wrongly claim they 
have the right to displace individual users of land and either sell it or lease it to strangers); Joseph Blocher, Building 
on Custom: Land Tenure Policy and Economic Development in Ghana, Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L. J. 166, 168-169 
(2006) (note) (arguing chiefs sometimes sell land “out from under” users); COTULA, ET. AL., supra note 168, at 
27 (arguing chiefs sell land they do not own). 
It should be noted that at least some chiefs take a hard line against the sale of peri-urban land to outsiders. 
For example, the chef de canton of Hamdallaye, a town a half-hour drive out the Fillingue Road from Niamey, 
claims he has steadfastly refused to authorize sales of customary agricultural land to investors or developers. 
Interview with Hamdallaye Canton Chief (May 1, 2018), supra note 17. He also uses his traditional authority and 
prestige to prevent his subjects from circumventing his authority and seeking authorization from the local mayor’s 
office. Id. However, this reluctance to permit land conversion appears not to be well grounded in formal law and 
is the exception rather than the rule. See Interview with Canton Chief of Koure (May 3, 2018), supra note 100 
(arguing that he lacks authority to prevent land sales); Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 
(May 2, 2018), supra note 180 (arguing canton chiefs lack authority to block land sales, even in rural areas). 
297 See Korling at note 1 (mentioning detention coutumere), (arguing chiefs often charge 5,000 FCFA to issue 
certificates of sale for village land). 
298 See generally Meyer, supra notes 20; see also Korling, supra note 20; Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey 
Commune 5, supra note 180. 
299 See Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 24 (describing the process of formalizing land). 
300 Meyer, supra note 20, at 190.  See generally Kelly, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8; Interview with Canton 
Chief of Koure, supra note 100 (arguing chiefs preside over historical examinations to determine who has rights to 
agricultural lands). 
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 Whether or not the chief thoroughly vets the land sale, he receives his fee and thus becomes a 
short-term winner in the conversion of land from fields to suburbs.301 
B. Losers 
 
1. Immediate Losers: Secondary Rights Holders 
 
When a land developer or speculator purchases a plot of agricultural land located in a 
peri-urban area – usually from a family patriarch or chief 302 – the complicated customary 
law bundle of nested, contingent, secondary rights that heretofore determined access to that 
land303 instantaneously vanishes.304  Rural people who depend on secondary rights in land 
find themselves with nothing. 
Women in rural communities are a prime example.305  Among rural Nigeriens, women do 
not customarily have the right to inherit or control agricultural land, however, this does not mean 
that they entirely lack rights in the lands controlled by their fathers, husbands, or brothers.306  As 
described above, women normally enjoy the right to enter land to harvest medicinal herbs, 
 
301 See Meyer, supra note 20, at 190, 252 (arguing chiefs extract fees for approving land sales); Korling, supra note 
20, at 125.  Although the chiefs are “short-term” winners, one can speculate that their authority, which is practically 
and spiritually rooted in the community’s lands, will wither as the chiefs convert the community land to individually 
owned parcels.  See generally Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8; Becker, supra note 104; SHIPTON, supra 
note 8; Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 15. 
302 See Ubink, Courts and Peri-Urban Practice, supra note 194 at 37 (arguing chiefs in Ghana sometimes connive 
with family elders to sell land out from under the control of extended families); see also Interview with Former 
Mayor of Niamey Commune 5, supra note 180; Korling, supra note 20, at 106 (arguing land sales on the edge of the 
city usually start when a buyer approaches the head of a family). 
303 See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 102, at 682; SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 309; Becker, supra note 104; 
Chimhown & Woodhouse, supra note 104; Polavarapu, supra note 104; Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra 
note 9, at 1007, 1015. 
304 See Chimhowu & Woodhouse, supra note 104, at 347-8 (arguing land titling often extinguishes secondary 
“safety-net” rights such as wood gathering); see also Ubink, Tenure Security, supra note 57, at 222 (arguing titling 
schemes often ignore secondary rights holders); COTULA ET AL., supra note 168, at 18 (arguing land titling often 
leads to loss of secondary rights by women and pastoralists); Polavarapu, supra note 104, at 114 (arguing that 
“nested rights” disappear when land is turned into a commodity). 
305 Polavarapu, supra note 104, at 99-100. 
306 See Polavarapu, supra note 104, at 111 (describing women’s secondary land rights under pre-colonial customary 
law in Botswana); see Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 682. 
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collect straw, or plant a small garden.307  These rights in land are not merely at the sufferance of 
their husbands and male relatives; they are part of a finely-honed, well understood cultural and 
spiritual complex.308  If a male to denies or violate a woman’s customary rights, he will bring 
shame on himself and his family, and the spirits tied to the land may sanction him.309  
 Later-born men can be frozen out when their older brothers or uncles sell the family 
lands.310  As described in Part III. A., the family patriarch typically acts in the role of caretaker or 
trustee for the extended family’s lands. 311  This means that a later-born man must seek the 
patriarch’s approval before clearing or cultivating a new plot, but it does not mean that the 
patriarch in any sense owns the family lands.312  However, if the patriarch sells the land to an 
outsider, the land becomes governed by state law, not customary law.   Thus, the later-born 
man’s access rights suddenly disappear,313 whether or not the patriarch decides to share the 
financial proceeds from the sale.314 
 Customary slaves – a group most Nigeriens prefer not to discuss315 – also lose their 
culturally enforceable secondary rights in land when it is sold to developers or investors.  It is 
beyond the scope of this article to discuss the complicated bundle of Nigerien social categories 
 
307 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 682. 
308 See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 683; see also Hagberg, supra note 60, at 104 (arguing those 
who attempt to sell lineage lands in rural Burkina Faso risk sanction from the spirit world). 
309 See Hagberg, supra note 60, at 10 (arguing earth priests and elders regard the earth “as a divinity and fear that the 
violation of rituals may endanger not merely the individual’s well-being but community life in general”). 
310  See Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1007 (arguing younger men in Nigerien villages have 
limited rights to land access and are subject to the demands of the greater group and village Elders). 
311  See id. 
312  See id. 
313  See Chimhowu & Woodhouse, supra note 104, at 347-8; see also Ubink, Tenure Security, supra note 57, at 222; 
COTULA ET AL., supra note 168, at 18; Polavarapu, supra note 104, at 114. 
314  JIMU, supra note 2, at 363 (arguing some sellers of customary land spend the proceeds on frivolity). 
315
  See Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1012 (arguing Nigerien government officials deny that 
slavery exists in Niger). 
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inexactly lumped together under the English word “slave” or the French word esclave.316  It must 
suffice to say that under Nigerien customary law, slaves have a culturally enforceable right to 
demand of village founders the use of sufficient agricultural lands to feed themselves and their 
families.317  In some villages, slave lineages have been cultivating tracts of land for generations, 
land they do not control, but to which they have culturally enforceable access rights.318  Under 
custom, a patriarch that unceremoniously ejected a slave from agricultural lands would bring 
shame on his lineage.319  If, on the other hand, the patriarch sells the family land cultivated by 
the slave, the culturally defined and enforceable rights described above simply vanish.320  Once 
the transaction is complete, the legal context instantaneously morphs: customary law holds its 
relevance and “ownership” instantaneously vests in the individual who holds the piece of paper 
reflecting title. 
2.  Long Term Losers 
     a.   Those Who Depend on Customary Land for Livelihoods 
 For secondary rights holders, the loss resulting from the legal conversion of land from 
custom to formal state law are sudden and dramatic.  For primary rights holders, the losses 
become apparent over time. 
 Imagine, for example, a village patriarch in a peri-urban zone sells all or much of his 
family’s ancestral lands to a developer or speculator.  Assume he obtained some form of 
 
316  See id. at 1013-16. 
317  See id. at 1017, 1022 (arguing Nigerian custom requires nobles to make agricultural land available to slave, but 
in adopting western notions of land law, they can abandon this.) 
318  See id. at 1034. 
319  Id. at 1032. 
320  Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1032. 
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permission from the sale from all or most of the heads of household in his lineage, though that is 
not always the case.321 
Assume also that he receives a large amount of money in exchange for the land.  I have 
heard of one such transaction for which the purchaser paid the equivalent of $20,000322 - a 
substantial fortune in a country where most people live off of less than two dollars per day.323 
The money rarely lasts.  In African locales, where peri-urban ancestral land is being sold  to 
developers, stories abound of patriarchs who spend the proceeds on la belle vie: drink, women, 
and flashy possessions.324   In Niger, a country where most rural people profess and practice 
Islam and live sober, acetic lives,325 the money may not go to alcohol and high living but 
instead to satisfy the lineage’s pent-up demand for life’s necessities.326   Young men who have 
delayed marriage because they lack money for a bride price payment require financial backing 
from the patriarch.327   Family members living in grass huts require the construction of more 
expensive banco houses with metal roofs.328  Linage members who have been making due 
 
321  See Blocher, supra note 296, at 168-9 (arguing chiefs in Ghana sometimes sell land out from under its rightful 
users); see also Ubink, supra note 57, at 216 (similar); Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 127 (arguing chiefs in Niger 
do not own communal land but sometimes sell it without consultation). 
322 Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, supra note 100 (arguing purchases of rural land in Koure, near Niamey, 
sometimes amount to $10,000 or $20,000, a huge amount in Niger). 
323 See Niger: Country Profile, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at 
https://www.who.int/hac/crises/ner/background/profile/en (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (reporting that over 60% of 
Niger’s population lives with less than $1 a day).  See also Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: 
Niger, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 20, 2015), available at https://2009-
2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252713 (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) 
(reporting that in 2011, 48.2% of Niger’s population lived under the poverty income level of $1.70 a day). 
324 See JIMU, supra note 2, at 38 (arguing most proceeds from land sales in Malawi are spent on “beer, prostitutes, 
and pot,” and on general “conspicuous consumption”). 
325 Kelley, Exporting Western Law to the Developing World, supra note 134.  My characterization of Nigeriens 
leading sober and ascetic lives is based on my years of experience and observation in rural communities there. 
326 Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, supra note 100.  See also Becker, supra note 104, at 120 (arguing some 
sellers of ancestral land in Mali, a predominantly Muslim country, spend lavishly by giving gifts and offering their 
friends rides in their new cars); JIMU, supra note 2, at 312-3 (arguing in Malawi land sales are often motivated by 
practical financial concerns such as the payment of school fees, medical bills, bride-wealth payments, or tombstones 
for dead relatives, though some of these justifications are “after-the-fact rationalizations.”) 
327 Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, supra note 100. 
328 I base this statement on personal knowledge of Nigerien friends who live in the U.S. and who send home 
remittances so their relatives can switch from grass to banco. 
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with donkey carts feel the urgent need for motorcycles.329   And, of course, the sale of 
agricultural land means that the lineage’s ability to grow its own staple crops diminishes or 
disappears, so they must purchase their grain at the market if they are to avoid starvation.330   
The small fortune disappears quickly.331 
When the money is gone, rural Nigeriens have no place else to turn.  Niger has no 
equivalent of mid-20th century Detroit or Chicago where former agricultural workers can 
migrate to seek factory jobs.332   Even if such jobs existed, the former subsistence farmers 
would have no relevant skills to offer, since the vast majority are illiterate.333 In short, when 
the proceeds from the sale of ancestral lands run out, rural people will suffer.334 
 
 
329 Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, supra note 100. 
330 See JIMU, supra note 2, at 71 (arguing that in Malawi the conversion of peri-urban land led to declines in food 
production and increased poverty and insecurity for rural people). 
331 Interview with a Highly Placed Official in Niger’s Ministry of the Environment and of Durable Development, 
supra note 258 (arguing peasant farmers are “selling their patrimony” and that in many cases the money they receive 
only lasts for months or years).  It should be noted that counter-examples exist.  There are instances where those 
who sell their ancestral land invest wisely or start small businesses and prosper.  JIMU, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing 
some sellers of ancestral lands in Malawi use the proceeds to start a small business or obtain a commercial driving 
license and prosper, though most spend the money quickly).  Of the many Nigeriens I have interviewed over the 
years, I have met one who prospered as a result of land sales.  He was from the village of Goudel.  Niger’s 
government expropriated much of his family’s agricultural land over the decades.  After the start of democratization 
in the early 1990s, the government tried to compensate him and similarly situated Goudel farmers by granting them 
a share of the undeveloped suburban house plots that had been carved out of their old fields.  This man sold many of 
those house plots and used the cash to buy a bar in Niamey.  Over the following decades, the bar grew into a small 
empire of bars, nightclubs, hotels, tourist businesses, transport, and real estate holdings.  However, as the text 
indicates, such economic success stories are the exception, not the rule. 
332 See SHIPTON, supra, note 8, at 144 (arguing Kenya lacked the industry to create jobs for people made landless by 
land titling; see also JIMU, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing wage jobs were not available for Malawi citizens rendered 
landless). 
333 The World Factbook (Niger), U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, available at https:// 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (reporting 19.1% of 
Nigeriens over the age of 15 are literate). 
334 Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, supra note 100 (arguing Nigerien farmers who well their land “end up 
poor”); Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey’s Central Government, in Niamey, Niger (May 11, 2018 (arguing 
proceeds of rural land sale go for weddings, trips, and motorcycles, and “then they’re left with nothing—they 
become beggars and thieves”); Interview with Judge, in Niamey, Niger (May 9, 2018 (arguing after rural land sales 
in Niger, “pretty soon the money is gone and they [the farmers] starve”).  See also Jimu, supra note 2, at 338 
(arguing land sellers in Malawi who cannot find wage labor end up destitute); Falk, supra note 171, at 1 (arguing 
that in African contexts landlessness is synonymous with poverty). 
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 b. Those Who Define Themselves, Their Communities, Their 
History, and Their Religion with Reference to Ancestral Land 
For rural people in peri-urban Niger, hunger is not the only consequence of land sales 
because land represents more than just a means of food production.335  The legal 
transformation of ancestral land into a salable commodity – in effect converting land into 
money336 – effaces the historical, cultural, and spiritual legacy that until now had given shape 
and strength to rural Nigerien communities.337 
Rural Nigeriens may be desperately poor by international standards,338 but overall, 
they lead lives of honor and purpose.339  They take pride in offering food and shelter to 
travelers.340    If a stranger wants to extend their stay in the village, the village chief or other 
lineage heads will accord him access to enough land to feed himself and his family.341  
Villagers look after one another, periodically gathering together to cultivate and harvest the 
fields of sick or recently deceased members of the community or to build huts for newlywed 
couples.342  Respect for age is common.343  Theft is rare.344  Rural Nigeriens generally live in 
peace, mediating their differences in ways that Americans should emulate: they gather in 
public, talk things through, and endeavor to find compromise, a modus vivendi that permits 
them to navigate the difficult business of living together amidst some of the harshest 
 
335 See supra Part III.A 
336 Interview with Former Gamkalle Resident and His Friend, supra note 208; Interview with Former Mayor of 
Niamey’s Central Government, supra note 334. 
337 See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 667, 710, n. 135; see also SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 14. 
338 See Human Development Reports, supra note 19; The World Factbook (Niger), supra note 19. 
339 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 667. 
340 See id. (arguing visitors to Nigerien villages “are plied with food and gifts”). 
341 See id. at 666 (describing a family making agricultural land available to an outsider who wished to settle in the 
village). 
342 See id. (arguing in the Zarma language of Niger, the word bogu describes communal labor, often undertaken on 
behalf of a villager in need and is the rough equivalent of “barn raising” in English). 
343 Id. at 667; see also SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 14 (arguing respect for age is common among the Luo people of 
Kenya). 
344 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 673. 
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geographic and climatic conditions on earth.345 
These positive attributes of Nigerien rural society arise out of an undivided complex of 
spiritual, historical, and cultural beliefs in which land, including individuals’ rights in and 
obligations toward land, is a central tenet.346  Land gives shape to rural peoples’ identities and 
sense of self.347  Even considering the recent increase of Islamic influence, most rural 
Nigeriens believe their ancestors made pacts with the spirits who control the land and that 
those spirits, along with the spirits of their ancestors continue to watch over the decisions and 
actions villagers take.348  A young man in the village avoids unruly behavior because he has 
been raised that way, but also because he does not want to be the one to spark the spirits’ 
wrath and thereby diminishes the village’s barka.349  He accepts his father’s or uncle’s 
decisions about which plot of land to cultivate, and about when he can begin cultivating for 
his own rather than the extended family’s account, because to object, to rebel, would injure 
not only his family but would insult the original land spirits and the spirits of his ancestors.350 
That same young man, once his elders have accorded him a portion of the family land for 
 
345 See id. at 710.  I am fully aware that depicting rural life in Niger in this way risks sparking the ire of scholars who 
condemn as simplistic the colonial and post-colonial thesis that rural Africans live in harmony with themselves and 
nature.  See generally Mark Davidheiser, Harmony, Peacemaking, and Power: Controlling Processes and African 
Mediation, 23 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 281, 282-6 (2006) (summarizing various critiques of the “harmony thesis”).  
But ire be damned. Yes, rural Nigeriens sometimes vie with one another over resources. Yes, intractable conflicts 
sometimes arise within and among villages that can only be resolved with outside intervention. Yet, the cooperative 
practices described above, and the overall peaceful, positive nature of Nigerien villages, is both an ideal toward 
which Nigeriens strive and an empirical fact. 
346 See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 704 (arguing land is a key element in maintaining village 
harmony); see also Becker, supra note 104, at 115 (arguing customary land helps “define cultural identity through 
social relations”). 
347 Shipton, supra note 8, at 110-11, 17 (arguing that the Luo people of Kenya view themselves as belonging to the 
land and, through the medium of the land, belonging to other people and that land is “tied up with some of the most 
intimate, emotionally charged dimensions of personhood and pride”). 
348 See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 647-8. 
349 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 704; see also Hagberg, supra note 60, at 99 (arguing village leaders 
in Burkina Faso consider the land “as a divinity and fear that the violation of rituals may endanger not merely the 
individual’s well-being but community life in general”). 
350 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 704; JIMU, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing land is a symbolic medium 
through which living people connect with their ancestors and their traditions); Blocher supra note 296, at 174 
(arguing trust and honor can play a vital role in consistent land practices leading to stability and efficiency). 
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cultivation, will avoid waste and certainly avoid sale, because he understands that interest in 
the land is shared not only by his living relations, but by those who lived before and those 
members of the family and community yet unborn.351 
When land is titled and sold out of the community, those beliefs that tie together history, 
spirituality and law disappear.352  If the spirits and their influence are displaced by a legal title 
– a piece of paper filed in a distant town saying an outsider now owns the property – that 
young man can take his proceeds, (assuming he is not struck by lightning or otherwise quickly 
felled by illness or other misfortune)353 and ignore concerns about the ancestors’ wrath.354  He 
can disregard the wishes of his father, his lineage head, and his village chief, because they no 
longer have influence over his and his children’s future access to land.355  That issue will be 
decided not by village elders, but by who can decode the foreign, formal legal process, obtain 
the necessary piece of paper and properly register it in the distant cadaster. 
In sum, land is an essential aspect of the social, spiritual, historical and legal complex that 
provides structure and meaning to rural Nigerien communities.  Removing land from this 
 
351 See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8; see also Njoh, supra note 27, at 555 (arguing land sales are 
unthinkable in Nigerien customary law because those who control land hold it act as custodians for future 
generations); Blocher, supra note 296, at 174 (arguing chiefs in Ghana hold land in trust for the living, the dead, and 
the not yet born). 
352 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 704-7; see Korling, supra note 20, at 133-34 (arguing authority in 
Nigerien rural communities is tied to land and those who alienate land lose their authority); Becker, supra note 104, 
at 115 (arguing “Where land is not a commodity, its non-market values define cultural identity through social 
relations.  When and where land sales occur marks a fundamental agrarian change that breaks cultural ties to the 
land…”). 
353 See SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 159 (arguing that in Kenya those who title an alienate family land “expose 
themselves to the wrath of the spirits”). 
354 Becker, supra note 104, at 121 (arguing in Mali, land sales are leading to a decline in cooperative spirit of the 
ethnic group’s values).  See also Ubink, supra note 57, at 223 (arguing studies of peri-urban land sales show 
abundant evidence of high social cost, especially for the poor). 
355 Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 70; see also Becker, supra note 104, at 121. (arguing land sales in 
peri- urban Mali contribute to “a decline in the cooperative spirit of the ethnic group’s values” that will “radically 
change the village in the next generation”). 
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complex will profoundly disrupt a system that has permitted Nigeriens to persevere for many 





356 See Becker, supra note 104, at 115 (arguing land conversion creates “new territories with new boundaries, new 
rules and new authorities claiming new legitimacy to control access” leading to “a profound transformation of 
society”); SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 128-29 (arguing land titling in Kenya threatens to upset the deeply rooted 
land-related traditions and may lead to social disruption). 
